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The Lady, or the Tiger? 
A Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative 
Linda L. Berger* 
We can no longer take language for granted as a medium 
of communication.  Its transparency has gone.  We are like people 
who for a long time looked out of a window without noticing 
the glass—and then one day began to notice this too.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Metaphor and narrative reassure us that things hang together, providing a 
sense of coherence to the patterns and paths we employ for perception and 
expression.  Without the metaphorical process that allows us to gather them 
up, group them together, and contain them, our perceptions would scatter like 
marbles thrown on the ground.2  Without the ability to tell stories that link 
discrete events together, place them into a storyline with a beginning and end, 
and compose a coherent accounting, our lives would be constructed of “One 
Damn Thing After Another.”3 
In this field guide, I hope to illustrate—with images and stories when 
possible—how better understanding of metaphor and narrative can guide 
those engaged in legal rhetoric and persuasion.  This Article briefly summa-
rizes cognitive theory relating to metaphor and narrative, provides snapshots 
of their use in the field, in real-life legal persuasion, and suggests ways to 
adapt metaphor and narrative to a specific example of legal persuasion.  In the 
field guide section, this Article uncovers a few of the metaphorical frames and 
narrative paths that exist in practice.  In the guided exploration, to illustrate 
the process of excavating and re-shaping persuasive arguments, this Article 
explores the briefs and opinions in Boykin v. Alabama,4 the U.S. Supreme 
 *   Professor of Law, Mercer Law School.  Thanks to the Washburn Law Journal for devoting this 
issue of the law review to articles about legal rhetoric, and thanks to Mercer Law School and my colleagues 
there for helping me explore legal rhetoric.  I very much appreciate the assistance of my research assistant, 
Jordan Wiegele. 
 1. IRIS MURDOCH, SARTRE 27 (1953). 
 2. See Linda Berger, Preface, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS vii, vii (2010).  This concept 
draws on the metaphors that the mind is a container and ideas are objects.  See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & 
MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN 
THOUGHT 12425, 338 (1999). 
 3. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 3031 (2002). 
 4. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
BERGER_MACRO_FINAL 3/29/2011  1:03:25 PM 
276 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 50 
 
Court decision requiring an affirmative showing that a guilty plea was entered 
voluntarily and knowingly. 
But first, the story of The Lady, or the Tiger?: 
  Once upon a time, the ruler of a kingdom came up with a fair, final, and 
prompt way of deciding guilt or innocence as well as the sentence to be im-
posed.  The accused would be taken to the public arena and asked to choose one 
of two doors leading to two concealed chambers: behind one door was a raven-
ous tiger, who would devour the guilty; behind the other was a ravishing lady, 
who would marry the innocent. 
  It came to pass that the ruler’s daughter fell in love with a young man who 
was unsuitable.  Charged with unsuitability, his fate too would be decided in the 
arena.  The ruler’s daughter was very much in love, and also very jealous; she 
had seen her lover exchange words with a beautiful young woman at the court.  
She set about finding out which door would open to the chambers in which the 
lady awaited and which to the chambers holding the tiger.  In her determination, 
she discovered not only which door concealed which judgment.  She learned al-
so that the lady awaiting her lover was the very same, very beautiful young 
woman from court. 
  On the day of judgment, in the public arena, the ruler’s daughter sat beside 
the ruler.  The young lovers exchanged a meaningful glance.  The ruler’s daugh-
ter moved her right hand very slightly to the right.  Without a moment’s hesita-
tion, her lover opened the door to the right.  And there the story ends.5 
I re-tell this story here for two reasons.  First, like other good stories, it 
invites the reader to fill in the blanks, to predict the ending that would occur 
within the world that the story creates in the reader’s imagination.  Our pre-
dictions of how the story ends—with the lady or the tiger—depend on our 
prior experiences and knowledge of the world.  And we make these predic-
tions largely on the basis of what we already know rather than on what the 
story reveals.  Second, because this story has become part of our cultural 
knowledge base, it illustrates how imperfectly an oft-told tale becomes em-
bedded in our imagination.  For me, a reference to The Lady, or the Tiger? 
conjures up an image of an unsolvable dilemma, a framework of being forced 
to make a fateful choice whose outcome depends entirely on chance.  In the 
original story, however, the outcome appears to be governed not so much by 
chance as by the conflicting emotions of love and jealousy. 
Like The Lady, or the Tiger?, the stories and images we acquire from 
our culture and experience provide mental blueprints that, for better or for 
worse, help us sort through and understand new things.  Equally important, 
these images and stories trigger empathy and emotion, helping us persuade 
others about the paths that events should follow and the frameworks into 
which things should fit. 
 5. I have shortened and otherwise taken liberties with the short story published by Frank R. Stockton, 
The Lady, or the Tiger?, 25 CENTURY 83, 83–86 (1882). 
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II.  BACKGROUND: COGNITIVE THEORY AND RESEARCH 
Although they are as old as rhetoric, it is hard to understand the continu-
ing objections to the study and use of metaphor and narrative in legal argu-
ments.  The first objection is that the only legitimate legal argument is the one 
that is based on reason (even though we can describe reason only by using 
metaphors: reason is pure, cold, and hard).6  But at least since Aristotle, we 
have known that persuasion depends on knowing when and how to use a 
combination of fact, logic, story, and image.7  Second, some critics object that 
metaphorical and narrative expressions are not the literal truth: they do not 
“fit” reality.  As others have pointed out, however, the literal truth is hard to 
come by, particularly in the kind of legal expression that depends on being 
able to argue for many different outcomes.8  The third objection appears to be 
that using metaphor and narrative to express concepts and describe events 
may result in unexamined assumptions and unforeseen consequences.  Yet, 
although it likely is true that unthinking adherence to a metaphor may enslave 
thought, it is equally true that unthinking adherence to the syllogistic form 
will constrain thought.9 
Despite these objections, much research indicates that because of the 
way the mind works and the culture is constructed, images and stories un-
avoidably shape our perceptions and reasoning processes, often uncon-
sciously.10  Cognitive theory suggests that lawyers will gain two benefits from 
studying metaphor and narrative, the argument-shaping language uses that are 
discussed in this Article.  First, lawyers will better understand judicial deci-
sion-making when they observe metaphor and narrative in action in judicial 
opinions and briefs.  Second, as a result of this deeper understanding, they 
 6. Steven Winter noted the metaphorical nature of claims that “reason is cold; it is rigorous; it is lin-
ear; it is clear; it is felt.  Indeed, in its dependence on embodied experiences like temperature and rigor, the 
metaphorical quality of reason is anything but detached and impersonal.”  Steven L. Winter, Death Is the 
Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745, 749 (1992); see also STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE 
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 5962 (2001) [hereinafter WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST]. 
 7. See, for example, the discussion of narrative rationality as a model for going beyond persuasion 
based on formal or informal logic alone, starting with Aristotle and continuing through Walter Fisher, in J. 
Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 
53, 6063 (2008). 
 8. “[L]egal argumentation is not concerned with proof of absolute truths, but acknowledges that it is 
always possible to argue for or against a particular claim.”  Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as 
Argument, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 166, 167 (2006). 
 9. Justice Cardozo’s famous quote came in Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926):  
“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by 
enslaving it.”  It seems appropriate to offset it here with a quote from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  The felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the 
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syl-
logism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 
1963) (1881). 
 10. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 21745; LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 128; see 
also KENDALL HAVEN, STORY PROOF: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE STARTLING POWER OF STORY 89122 
(2007). 
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will more effectively use metaphor and narrative to construct persuasive le-
gal arguments.11 
All the argument-shaping approaches discussed in this Article are meta-
phorical in the following senses.  First, they rely on seeing one thing as an-
other.  Second, each of them works by mapping or transferring the character-
istics, reasoning processes, and outcomes of one domain (the source) onto 
another (the target).  As a result, each of these language uses carries more (or 
less) meaning than appears.  Because they are ways of seeing or highlighting 
some aspects of a concept, they also are ways of not seeing others. 
Thus, when you tell a story, you are asking the listener to see a series of 
things as related events governed by a particular narrative arc or a plot.  If you 
tell the story well, the listener will expect certain characters and plot devel-
opments even though other storylines might also explain the same events.12  
Moreover, if the story you are telling is one that already is embedded in tradi-
tion and culture, you need not fill in all the details; you can simply name the 
characters, and the plot will spring to life in the listener’s mind. 
Because they emerge from and exist within our culture and experience, 
these argument-shaping language uses carry with them not only information 
but also values and beliefs.  By helping to establish meaning and create iden-
tity,13 they unconsciously transmit traditions, cultural values, and ideolo-
A.  Metaphor and Other Conceptual Frames 
Because metaphor carries over attributes, inferences, frameworks, 
reasoning methods, and evaluation standards from one source to another, its 
use can help the writer persuade the reader to make the leap and to do it “in 
such a way as to make it seem graceful, compelling, even obvious.”15  When 
we consciously use metaphor and other language frames, we provide concrete 
 11. According to Steven Winter, 
From a cognitive perspective, it does not matter that legal decisionmaking is a product of tacit 
knowledge rather than doctrinal logic.  The process is one of persuasion.  To ask about the charac-
terizations that people are likely to find convincing is to inquire into what will make the most 
sense to them under the circumstances.  It is to inquire into the nature of their categories and con-
cepts—for it is our categories and concepts that define our expectations and, in so doing, power-
fully shape what we find believable, what we judge accurate, what we experience as cogent, com-
pelling and convincing. 
WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 6, at 152–53. 
 12. According to Winter, narrative is understood because of metaphor; that is, we have constructed an 
idealized cognitive model of a story that includes conceptual schemas that “serve as a kind of genetic mate-
rial or template for a wide variety of stories in which the plot structure follows a protagonist through an agon 
to a resolution.”  WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 6, at 110. 
 13. Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination Law School, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 137, 142–43 (2001) (discussing PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1986)). 
 14. Kissam, supra note 13, at 14748 (discussing J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF 
IDEOLOGY (1998)).  Balkin discussed “cognitive mechanisms that help produce and fashion beliefs and 
judgments,” including cultural heuristics, narratives and scripts, metaphor and metonymy, homologies, and 
associations.  BALKIN, supra, at 3. 
 15. Donald A. Schön, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-setting in Social Policy, in 
METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 137, 147 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993). 
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n the copier is an outlaw who should be subject to 
captu
ciousness 
beca
ritten on paper, deposited in a mailbox, and delivered 
to a p
ng as protected expression no different from the speech 
of in
 experi-
ence
images that make it easier to think about and manage abstract or unfamiliar 
concepts.  If the audience accepts the metaphor that a copyright constitutes 
property like real estate, it will transfer inferences and rules from one concept 
to the other and certain consequences will follow.  Like real estate, copyrights 
can be bought and sold, divided, leased, and even protected against trespass.  
Similarly, if the person who copies a piece of music in violation of a 
copyright is a pirate, the
re and punishment. 
In addition to purposefully using metaphor and other framing devices to 
aid in understanding, we often are unconsciously affected by them.  Imagina-
tive maps for understanding become deeply embedded in our cons
use we acquire them through our daily experience in the world. 
Metaphor is obviously helpful to understand new and unfamiliar con-
cepts.  Years after we were introduced to the Internet, metaphor still pervades 
the way that we talk about it. We receive electronic mail on our desktop, we 
browse for information as we might in a bookstore, and we use folders and 
bookmarks.  Because of these images, it seems appropriate to treat a legal is-
sue concerning the delivery of an e-mail the same way that we analyze an is-
sue involving a letter w
hysical desktop. 
Conceptual metaphor is equally effective for understanding and 
reasoning about the abstract concepts that often underlie legal arguments.  For 
example, the lawyer who wishes to argue that the First Amendment should 
protect corporate political advertising relies on the metaphors that a 
corporation is a person and that money is speech.  She is thus able to portray 
corporate advertisi
dividuals. 
According to the cognitive researchers who study metaphor, its persua-
sive power derives from several sources.  First, we are often governed by tacit 
knowledge and unconscious assumptions and inferences: both information 
and understanding float beneath the surface, neither consciously acquired nor 
examined.16  Because the tacit knowledge we have acquired through
 is at work automatically and always, it can remain uncontested. 
 
 16. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 915; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2007) (discussing “[c]ultural cognition . . . [that is,] psychological mechanisms 
that moor our perceptions of societal danger to our cultural values”); John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-
Centered Representation: What Is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide, 6 
CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 88–89 (1999) (“It makes complete sense to me that our legal texts float in a sea of var-
ied and often conflicting cultural and historical narratives from which their ultimate meaning is derived.”); 
James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 684, 695 (1985) (“Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something rather than out 
of nothing.  It always starts in a particular culture and among particular people . . . .  Rhetoric always takes 
place with given materials.”). 
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ema, which in turn leads to more complex 
conceptual metaphors such as life as a journey.24  The resulting mental blue-
prints provide both s
, which appear to be designed to 
 
Second, thought processes themselves are said to be metaphoric: meta-
phor is both a figure of thought and a way of thinking.17  Metaphors 
are derived from bodily experience (balance keeps you upright; more is up 
because when you pile things on top of each other, the stack goes up),18 visual 
images (the mouth of the river, the long arm of the law), and stories (the Tro-
jan Horse, the Sword in the Stone, the Holy Grail).  Concepts such as knowing 
is seeing and understanding is grasping are directly linked to the way we 
learn about the world through the senses of sight and touch.19  And because 
metaphor transf
 and understand abstract concepts in the same way that we see and grasp 
physical ones. 
Third, logical reasoning appears to be structured metaphorically.20  We 
make sense out of new experiences by placing them into categories21 and 
cognitive frames called schema or scripts that emerge from prior experi-
ence.22  Because of our experience in the world, we see categories as contain-
ers with an interior, an exterior, and a boundary.23  Similarly, as we go about 
our lives, we acquire and construct schema and scripts.  For example, we ex-
perience movement from a beginning along a path to the end, giving rise to 
the source-path-goal image sch
hortcuts and stereotypes. 
B.  Narrative and Other Event Paths 
Narrative shapes our understanding and expression in a somewhat 
different way.  Compared with metaphor, a story is more path than template, 
and its outcome is more an expected ending than a compelled one.  Compared 
with syllogistically structured arguments
 17. Schön, supra note 15, at 137 (describing metaphor as referring “both to a certain kind of product—
a perspective or frame, a way of looking at things—and to a certain kind of process—a process by which new 
perspectives on the world come into existence”).  Lakoff writes that the word “metaphor” has come to mean 
tual system” while the term “metaphorical expression” means the 
 Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR 
rew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993). 
 Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1189 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Pre-
t
enerally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
AL. L. REV. 1103, 11311218 (2004) (describing the literature 
ritical building blocks of the human cogni-
“a cross-domain mapping in the concep
linguistic expression of the mapping.  George Lakoff, The Contemporary
AND THOUGHT 203 (And
 18. Lakoff, supra note 17, at 240. 
 19. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 6, at 5556. 
 20. Id. at 5668. 
 21. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 19109 (explaining categories and their use at the 
U.S. Supreme Court).  For discussions of the use of categories in law, see Martha Chamallas, Deepening the 
Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 77980 
(2001); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimina-
tion and
dic ably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 115455 (2002).  See generally Anthony Edward 
Falcone, Law and Limits: How Categories Construct Constitutional Meaning, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1005 
(2006). 
 22. See g
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. C
showing the ways in which categories and schemas are “c
tive process”). 
 23. Lakoff, supra note 17, at 21213. 
 24. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 3234, 6066. 
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convi
w, we also recognize that the legal arguments made in a brief are 
cons s.27  
In c
y be most 
effec
or 
struct
nce another of their truth, stories appear more concerned with 
persuading others of their believability.25 
Still, the story told in a legal brief “is thought to be a matter of demon-
stration, not persuasion . . . .  We can find the true and real world, says the 
convention, and we simply should report it in the story.”26  Despite this con-
ventional vie
trained because argument often must appeal to already accepted value
ontrast, 
[S]tories by their very nature can appeal to what is, by convention, still taboo in 
a culture.  Because facts themselves capture and reflect values, what cannot be 
argued explicitly can be sneaked into a story.  Indeed, the genius of storytelling 
as an act of persuasion is that it buries argument in the facts.28 
Like metaphor, stories are entangled in culture, resulting in common ar-
chetypes, myths, and master stories that help construct social and cultural 
norms, both by shaping them directly and by supporting particular ways of 
interpreting experiences.29  One aspect of this cultural entanglement may be 
what Professor Milner Ball identified as the natural affinity between narrative 
and democracy: while the “language of command . . . is hierarchical and dis-
tancing and therefore unsuitable to democracy, narrative is inherently com-
munal.  A story is shared.”30  Because of this attribute, narrative ma
tive as persuasion when the audience becomes part of the telling and the 
reader is invited to fill in the blanks in order to predict the ending.31 
Like metaphor, stories embedded in our experience provide mental blue-
prints and cognitive shortcuts.  In this way, storytelling becomes central to our 
ability to make sense out of a series of chronological events that we otherwise 
would experience as discrete and lacking in coherence and consistency.32  
Stories also make it easier for us to communicate our experiences, help us 
predict what will happen, and sketch out what we will need to do when we 
find ourselves entangled in a typical plight.33  Stories can become “recipes f
uring experience itself, for laying down routes into memory, for not only 
guiding the life narrative up to the present but directing it into the future.”34 
Narrative is thought to be persuasive for reasons similar to those sup-
porting the persuasiveness of metaphor.  Thus, narrative may be persuasive 
 
 25. JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 11 (1986) [hereinafter BRUNER, ACTUAL 
MINDS].  Bruner since has questioned his former comparisons between the narrative mode of thought and the 
logical-paradigmatic mode.  JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 27 n.19 (2002). 
 26. Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3132 (1984). 
 27. Id. at 32. 
 28. Id. at 33. 
 29. Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and 
Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 458 (1996). 
 30. Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280, 2288 
(1989). 
 31. Id. 
 32. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 3031. 
 33. Id. at 117. 
 34. Jerome Bruner, Life as Narrative, 71 SOC. RES. 691, 708 (2004). 
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nd expect a 
comm
nts by structuring the char-
acter
 can uncover what was unseen and unconscious in a judicial 
opinion.   Legal storytelling also takes place beneath the surface.42  Lawyers 
because, like metaphor, it is based on components we unconsciously under-
stand because of our experience in the world.  For example, the theme of a 
story incorporates a seemingly universal plight—such as “human jealousy” or 
“thwarted ambition”—as well as familiar characters who are more or less 
conscious of their plight.35  We have grown accustomed to a
on framework for the narrative; the story arc begins with a normal or 
ordinary situation, which is interrupted by Trouble, followed by efforts by the 
characters to address or resolve the Trouble, and culminating in a restoration 
of the old or the creation of a new “canonical . . . steady state.”36 
Some scholars theorize that narrative is inherent in the nature of our 
minds or language.37  Others claim that narrative persuades because it pro-
vides mental models of the ordinary course of eve
istic plights of humans.  By doing so, narrative makes experiences under-
standable and allows us to roughly predict the result.  Finally, narrative may 
be persuasive because it meets our psychological needs to hear coherent and 
believable accounts of the way the world works.38 
For lawyers, narrative does more than put logical propositions and legal 
arguments into an attractive form; it allows the storyteller to set the scene, es-
tablish a time frame, and tap into the listener’s understanding and identifica-
tion with the characters and their plights.39  As are other forms of rhetorical 
analysis, narrative analysis also is a tool for uncovering and discovering.40  
By calling attention to the “narrative transactions performed within the law,” 
narrative analysis
41
 
 35. Id. at 696. 
 36. BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, supra note 25, at 16.  Amsterdam and Bruner described the plot elements 
as fo
ry concludes . . . through some coda—say, 
n original). 
what is it about narratives that makes them persuasive in the 
law?
ays of understanding and structuring human experience; this makes 
 models of persuasion based on formal or informal logic, to en-
(3) N that are psychologically persuasive: 
y); 
antive property). 
nalytic instrument[] in [the] toolkit that might actually 
 o
out what 
ourt  Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992)). 
supra note 3, at 135. 
llows: 
(1) an initial steady state . . . , (2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble . . . , (3) in turn evoking efforts 
at redress or transformation, which succeed or fail, (4) so that the old steady state is restored or a 
new (transformed) steady state is created, (5) and the sto
for example, Aesop’s characteristic moral of the story. 
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113–14 (emphasis i
 37. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 11416. 
 38. Id. at 117.  To answer the question “
,” Chris Rideout suggested the following: 
(1) Narratives are “innate” w
them inherently persuasive. 
(2) Narrative models go beyond
compass “narrative rationality.” 
arratives embody several properties 
(a) Coherence (a formal property); 
(b) Correspondence (a formal propert
(c) Fidelity (a subst
Rideout, supra note 7, at 55. 
 39. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 13435. 
 40. Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology, 18 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 1, 2628 (2006).  Narrative analysis is an “a
be f some use with the legal plumbing.”  Id. at 28. 
 41. Id.  The opinion, as well as the story it tells, can be analyzed as a narrative written to persuade an 
audience that its story is “true” and correct and that each new episode fits into a master narrative ab
c s do.  Id. at 2628 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se.
 42. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, 
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and judges argue and decid limited, but also illumi-
nated
gory of narrative, rather than factual stories about a client’s plight, 
the field guide will focus on the inside stories that occur within appellate court 
briefs and opinions ng process, and in 
parti
o abstract concepts and to fit concepts into categories.  The 
resul
ura of literal, concrete truth.  Rather than being box-
like, however, the research suggests that categories have a radial center-
periphery structure.  Because categories radiate out from a prototype at the 
e within a context that is 
, by experiences and preconceptions derived from the culture’s mod-
els and myths.43 
III.  THE FIELD GUIDE 
This field guide is divided into two main categories.  Within the concep-
tual framing category, it describes language uses ranging from metonymy (us-
ing a part to stand for the whole) to ideographs (using a labeling word to call 
up a larger value or principle) to image schemas (using the images that we 
immediately identify as metaphors) to complex frames (combining metaphors 
and other framing devices into more complex structures).44  Within the path-
making cate
.  These are stories about the law-maki
cular, they are stories about the roles of judges and the development 
of the law. 
A.  Framing Devices (Lost and Found) 
Metaphor frames issues by allowing us to map inferences from concrete 
visual images ont
ts of either metaphorical process appear natural and inevitable.  If  
Church and State are separated by a wall, their working together is prohibited; 
if privacy falls within the category of liberty, it is protected by 
the Constitution. 
Although lawyers and judges use both image schemas45 and 
categorization, categorizing is far less suspect, perhaps because it appears in 
the form of a syllogism.46  According to cognitive research, however, our 
perception that a category is a box or container with clearly defined 
boundaries derives from metaphor, not empirical observation.  We see ideas 
as objects and categories as physical containers.  We gather up ideas, group 
them together, and contain them; objects fit inside or fall outside the 
boundaries of the container.  As a result, the process of assigning objects to 
categories takes on the a
 
 43. See, e.g., id. at 23239. 
 44. As might be expected from the description of categories, see infra Part III.A.1–4, these categories 
are not clearly delineated, and I have assigned some examples to one category when they might well have fit 
o
 an “image-based metaphor[] in which the visualized scene serves as the source 
bstract . . . domain.”  WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE 
OR
264 for a discussion of syllogisms. 
int  more than one.  For another metaphor categorization scheme, see Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor 
in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919 (2007). 
 45. An image schema is
domain whose inferential structure can be mapped to the a
F EST, supra note 6, at 36. 
 46. See id. at 6
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center, the fit of two it  same category can be 
signi
i-
cally
soning, and evaluation.50  The U.S. Supreme 
Cour
ses of corporate 
mone
 must be viewed as speech, and 
 
ems that fall into the
ficantly different.47 
1.  Metonymy: Money 
Metonymy and metaphor often work together, illustrating the elasticity 
of our imaginative ability to see one thing as another.  While a metaphor asks 
us to view one thing as something that it is not, metonymy asks us to see part 
of one thing as a stand-in for the whole.  Thus, one author has written that 
metaphor cannot claim to tell “nothing but the truth,” while metonymy cannot 
claim to tell “the whole truth.”48  While “a share of stock stands metonym
 for a share of the company, which is itself a metaphorical entity, . . . the 
company in turn stands metonymically for the company’s assets.  One’s name 
is metaphorical property, but it is also metonymic for the person named.”49 
Rather than mere wordplay, rhetorical choices such as these significantly 
affect our understanding, rea
t’s decisions about campaign contributions by corporations are recent 
and controversial examples that dramatically reveal what a difference such 
rhetorical choices can make. 
As I have discussed elsewhere,51 corporate participation in the market-
place of ideas often takes the form of money.  Money is given to someone to 
conduct the public relations, lobbying or advertising campaign, or to partici-
pate in a political campaign.  Before Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,52 the U.S. Supreme Court treated different u
y very differently: corporate money used to sell products or 
state positions on issues was transformed into speech while corporate money 
spent in election campaigns was viewed as the root of evil.53 
Transforming corporate money into protected speech required three met-
aphors to work together to form a complex frame: (1) the corporation must be 
viewed as a person, (2) spending money
 47. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 499–502; WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra 
te
 
Meta t it: 
ear to tell the truth . . . and nothing but the truth” 
but is unable to promise to tell “the whole truth.” 
. 
arris, Recognizing Legal Tropes: Metonymy as Manipulative Mode, 34 
M.
cal Choices in 
p t Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007). 
lection Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Austin v. Mich. State 
ha
no  6, at 69103. 
 48. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Right and the Essence of Wrong:
phor and Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481, 2515 (2003).  As Schroeder and Carlson pu
[N]either metaphor [nor] metonymy can take the stand as witness without perjuring itself.  Meta-
phor can “swear to tell the truth, the whole truth” but would lie if it implied that it also tells “noth-
ing but the truth.”  In contrast, metonymy can “sw
Id
 49. Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 866 (2007).  Judith Harris sug-
gested that the simplest use of metonymy, which she termed “street metonymy,” involves the naming of vis-
ceral parts for the whole—ranging from “brain” to “big mouth” to those that “liken[] the subject to his or her 
reproductive organs.”  Judith A. H
A  U. L. REV. 1215, 1219 (1985). 
 50. See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetori
Su reme Cour
 51. Id. 
 52. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 53. See generally McConnell v. Fed. E
C mber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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(3) th
 
impu
 this is the appropriate result—
corpo
s I 
and irst 
depi
nterests as against those of the public.’ ”61 
The 
e free market must be viewed as the appropriate model for analyzing 
free speech issues.54  With those metaphors mapping the way, corporate mon-
ey talks, and it can be protected as speech. 
Instead of this metaphorical process, a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court isolated money—a metonymical move—as the reference point for cor-
porate participation in election campaigns in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission,55 the decision overruled in Citizens United.56  In McConnell, the 
metonymical choice of money as the stand-in to refer to an entire concept was 
followed by another metaphorical transformation, but with a different result.  
Corporate money in election campaigns was “portrayed as the wellspring of 
evil, a source of temptation, a taint or a poison, a torrent that will flood the 
market and drown individual voices.”57  These metaphors freed regulatory
lses.  If money corrupts, tempts, poisons, and flows out of control, it 
must be subject to regulation.58  Thus, while speech in the metaphorical mar-
ket deserves protection, money in metonymical isolation requires regulation. 
The McConnell majority disassociated corporate money that enters elec-
tion campaigns from the speech or political participation that the money can 
buy; in other words, the majority isolated as only money what corporations 
contribute to the electoral process.59  In this way, the majority was able to 
treat the corporation’s First Amendment interests as less important than the 
government’s interests in regulating the adverse effects of corporate money.60  
There are many good arguments that
rations differ from individuals in ways that are important for self-
expression or self-government—but the majority never acknowledged that it 
was adopting such an argument. 
In the joint opinion of Justices Stevens and O’Connor upholding Title
II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), the majority f
cted corporate money as the ability to buy influence: 
More than a century ago the “sober-minded Elihu Root” advocated legislation 
that would prohibit political contributions by corporations in order to prevent 
“ ‘the great aggregations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or 
indirectly,’ ” to elect legislators who would “ ‘vote for their protections and the 
advancement of their i
goal of the current legislation (BCRA) was “to purge national politics of 
what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ cam-
paign contributions.”62 
 
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 114–126. 
lding a pre-election prohibition on “electioneering communications” funded by 
orp
ra note 50, at 950. 
, McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115. 
Id. (quoting UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 572). 
 55. 540 U.S. 93 (upho
c orations and unions). 
 56. 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 57. See Berger, sup
 58. See, e.g.
 59. Id. at 20305. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957)). 
 62. 
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 will vote according to the wishes of their larg-
est c
 ‘[t]o say that Congress is without power 
to pa
This metonymical view of corporate money was overtaken by the Citi-
zens U spec-
tive o 72
voke values, beliefs, and interpretations of how the world works.   In his   
 
In addition to buying influence, large financial contributions threaten 
both actual corruption and “the eroding of public confidence in the electoral 
process through the appearance of corruption.”63  Even without corruption, 
undue influence itself leads the public to buy into the “cynical assumption that 
large donors call the tune.”64  Not only might donors be seeking influence, 
they might also be interested in “avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting 
any particular ideology.”65  Rather than an opportunity to speak or participate 
in the political process, campaign fundraisers are “peddling access” to federal 
candidates and officeholders.66  Because money is the source of evil, includ-
ing the result that officeholders
ontributors, the best means of prevention is “to identify and to remove the 
temptation.”67  In fact, “[i]mplicit . . . in the sale of access is the suggestion 
that money buys influence.”68 
As for the restriction in the BCRA’s Title II on spending by corporations 
and labor unions on “electioneering communications,” the majority found a 
compelling state interest for the restrictions.  Prior decisions “represent re-
spect for the ‘legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corpo-
rate structure require particularly careful regulation.’ ”69  The majority wrote 
that “[w]e have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at ‘the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’ ”70  Once money is iso-
lated as the source of potential evil, “
ss appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from the improper 
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particu-
lar the power of self-protection.’ ”71 
nited view that corporate money is speech.  The metaphorical per
n money as speech will be discussed in the complex framing section.  
2.  Ideographs: Liberty, Property, Equality, Ten Commandments 
Ideographs are labeling words that carry ideological baggage as they in-
73
 63. Id. at 136 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 
(1982)). 
 64. Id. at 144 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000)). 
 65. Id. at 148. 
 66. Id. at 150. 
 67. Id. at 153. 
 68. Id. at 154. 
 69. Id. at 205 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)). 
 70. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
 71. Id. at 22324 (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934)). 
 72. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 73. “An ideograph is a culturally biased, abstract word or phrase . . . [that] represent[s] in condensed 
form the normative, collective commitments of the members of a public . . . .”  CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT 
& JOHN LOUIS LUCAITES, CRAFTING EQUALITY: AMERICA’S ANGLO-AFRICAN WORD xii (1993). 
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shap
 ideological commitments behind these ideographs 
are l on-
cept 
ng of homes in Kelo v. City of New London.   
The had 
it ba
they are discussing a bundle of sticks or a “collection of attributes in relation 
 
essay entitled The “Ideograph”: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, Mi-
chael Calvin McGee proposed that our political beliefs and ideologies are
ed by these words.74  Like Chinese characters, words are “ideographs” 
because “they signify and ‘contain’ a unique ideological commitment . . . .”75 
Among the most prominent ideographs in American legal rhetoric are 
liberty and property.  The
inked, the concept of individual property seemingly the basis for the c
of individual liberty: 
But in America, and here alone, we have gone at once to the fountain of liberty, 
and raised the people to their true dignity.  Let the lands be possessed by the 
people in fee simple, let the fountains be kept pure, and the streams will be pure 
of course . . . .  All other [free] nations have wrested property and freedom from 
barons and tyrants; we begin our empire with full possession of property and all 
its attending rights.76 
Property as an ideological concept was at the center of the explosive 
controversy surrounding the taki 77
re, Justice Thomas in dissent complained that the U.S. Supreme Court 
ckwards when it adopted a 
searching standard of constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, 
such as welfare benefits, while deferring to the legislature’s determination as to 
what constitutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent domain, 
and thereby invades individuals’ traditional rights in real property.  The Court 
has elsewhere recognized “the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home 
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic,” 
when the issue is only whether the government may search a home.  Yet today 
the Court tells us that we are not to “second-guess the City’s considered judg-
ments,” when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the infi-
nitely more intrusive step of tearing down petitioners’ homes.  Something has 
gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.  
Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes them-
selves are not.78 
As Justice Thomas noted, because of its utility, the concept of property 
has been metaphorically extended far beyond land, houses, and concrete ob-
jects capable of possession.  When lawyers discuss property, we know that 
 74. See generally Michael Calvin McGee, The “Ideograph”: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, 
66 Q.J. SPEECH 1 (1980). 
 75. Id. at 7.  For a discussion of McGee’s work with reference to legal briefs, see Ann Sinsheimer, The 
Ten Commandments as a Secular Historic Artifact or Sacred Religious Text: Using Modrovich v. Allegheny 
County to Illustrate How Words Create Reality, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 325 
(2005). 
 76. Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 273, 350 (1991) (quoting Noah Webster, An Examination of the Leading Principles of the Federal Con-
stitution (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 6061 (Paul Leices-
ter Ford ed., 1888)) (emphasis in original). 
 77. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  “Property—the cluster of beliefs tied up to the right to own one’s home, the 
right to have a voice in governmental decisions involving taxes on wages or other holdings, the right to pass 
on holdings from one generation to another, etc.—is a classic American ideograph.”  Richard A. Matasar, 
Trial Narratives and the Study of Law: Some Questions, 76 IOWA L. REV. 207, 212 n.25 (1990). 
 78. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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n entity, and it is only metaphorically trans-
ferab
f a color-blind U.S. Constitution  and a seemingly syllogis-
tic p
scrimination on the basis of race is to 
 
to things, . . . [attributes that] spring to life almost automatically once we say 
something is property . . . .”79  When we are asked to view new concepts as 
property, we assume certain characteristics, including “a discrete physical ob-
ject or spatial expanse; that persists through time; is subject to exclusion from 
use by others; is alienable; and is useful.”80  But as we move away from the 
prototype that created the category, some of these characteristics become less 
useful and drop away.  Water rights are treated like property rights though 
water is not a discrete object, intellectual property is treated as property even 
though it is “only metaphorically a
le to another for their use.”81 
The ideograph of equality, similarly linked to the country’s origins, has 
been asked to carry more weight than it could bear, especially since the hold-
ing in Brown v. Board of Education82 fifty years ago that “in the field of pub-
lic education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate edu-
cational facilities are inherently unequal.”83  Today, Brown is said to stand in 
for the concept o 84
roposition: 
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to 
school based on the color of their skin.  The school districts in these cases have 
not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once 
again—even for very different reasons.  For schools that never segregated on 
the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past seg-
regation, such as Jefferson County, the way “to achieve a system of determining 
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis,” is to stop assigning stu-
dents on a racial basis.  The way to stop di
stop discriminating on the basis of race.85 
Because of its cultural connection with the story of the country’s origins, 
equality is a concept with great power.  Law and society scholar Martha 
Fineman has long argued that a formal equality model—one that ignores gen-
der differences and treats spouses as if they are the same—will “only further 
and deepen existing inequalities.”86  Professor Fineman offers the possibility 
of a more effective framing of the issue, pointing to the 1999 decision of the 
Vermont Supreme Court holding that “same-sex couples were entitled to   
 
 79. John Martinez, A Cognitive Science Approach to Teaching Property Rights in Body Parts, 42 J. 
EG 4 (1992). 
, at 866 (internal format modified). 
07) (Thomas, J., 
at equality has been “reduced in its collective 
L AL EDUC. 290, 29
 80. Johnson, supra note 49
 81. Id. at 866. 
 82. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 83. Id. at 495. 
 84. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 (20
concurring); see Rideout, supra note 7, at 78–86 (giving a brief narrative analysis of Parents Involved). 
 85. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747–48 (Roberts, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 86. Martha Albertson Fineman, Evolving Images of Gender and Equality: A Feminist Journey, 43 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 437, 445 (2009).  Professor Fineman writes th
potential to a mere individual entitlement to be treated the same as everyone else regardless of the differences 
in material, social, historical, or other resources.”  Id. at 453. 
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recei
es or monuments for 
disp  Su-
prem
mine the message that the text here conveys, we 
pinions referred to “the Commandments,” while the 
disse
 had the 
effec ead 
pres
 
ve the legal benefits and protections” available to married couples 
of opposite sexes.87 
Ideographic analysis can uncover the persuasiveness of word choices 
seemingly less loaded with ideological value than equality, liberty, and prop-
erty, such as the use of the word tablets rather than plaqu
lays of the Ten Commandments.88  In Van Orden v. Perry,89 the U.S.
e Court adopted the historical monument approach: 
  The case before us is a borderline case.  It concerns a large granite monu-
ment bearing the text of the Ten Commandments located on the grounds of the 
Texas State Capitol.  On the one hand, the Commandments’ text undeniably has 
a religious message, invoking, indeed emphasizing, the Deity.  On the other 
hand, focusing on the text of the Commandments alone cannot conclusively re-
solve this case.  Rather, to deter
must examine how the text is used.  And that inquiry requires us to consider the 
context of the display. 
  In certain contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments can 
convey not simply a religious message but also a secular moral message (about 
proper standards of social conduct).  And in certain contexts, a display of the 
tablets can also convey a historical message (about a historic relation between 
those standards and the law)—a fact that helps to explain the display of those 
tablets in dozens of courthouses throughout the Nation, including the Supreme 
Court of the United States.90 
Professor Sinsheimer noted that in finding the display to be 
constitutional in Van Orden, the majority and concurring opinions referred to 
the Ten Commandments as “the monument” while the dissenting opinions 
referred to “the Commandments.”91  In McCreary County v. American Civil 
Liberties Union of Kentucky,92 issued the same day and finding the Ten 
Commandments displays at county courthouses to be unconstitutional, the 
majority and concurring o
nting opinion selected neutralizing language such as “the 
Foundations Displays.”93 
After analyzing the use of similar terms by the attorneys and the courts 
in prior cases, Professor Sinsheimer concluded that their word choices
t of neutralizing the religious nature of the displays at issue and inst
ented “the Ten Commandments as an historic plaque.”94  That is: 
 87. Id. at 458.  The Court based its decision not on the Equal Protection Clause, but on “a more 
expansive and earlier notion of equality derived from the experience of colonial America,” the Vermont 
Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause.  Id.  That clause states that the “government is, or ought to be, 
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for 
the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of 
that community.”  Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (citing VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7). 
 88. See Sinsheimer, supra note 75, at 340. 
 89. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 90. Id. at 70001 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original omitted). 
 91. Sinsheimer, supra note 75, at 347–48. 
 92. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 93. Sinsheimer, supra note 75, at 348. 
 94. Id. at 340. 
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 the state 
because it selected among a range of ideographs.  These ideographs were 
presented eir legal 
pleadings 
98  
100  Several authors have suggested that the penumbra meta-
phor  
of ca
rced surrender).  Certain 
ti
tice Douglas’ decision recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in       
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that the Ten 
Commandments represented history and not religious expression by
to the court, in part, by the parties to the dispute in th
which include the complaint and answer, and their briefs.95 
3.  Image Schemas: Wall of Separation, Penumbra 
Image schemas are the metaphors we most readily identify because they 
seek to map the inferences from concrete visual images onto abstract 
concepts.96  The best-known image schemas in American constitutional 
analysis are among the most heavily criticized.  Nonetheless, Thomas 
Jefferson’s metaphor of the “wall of separation between Church & State” has 
essentially replaced the language of the law,97 and the image of a wall has 
become our common-sense understanding about the relationship between 
religion and the government.   One author concludes that the metaphor has
been so powerful because it works so well: it is “simple, concrete, visual, 
creative, and concise.”99 
Similarly, the penumbra metaphor has been used to visualize and to ex-
plain the extension of a right or an obligation more broadly than the original 
understanding.
 reflects an understanding of the (center-periphery) radial structure
tegories: 
Certain activities are protected, for example, by lying “within” the First 
Amendment (association), the Fourth Amendment (protection from search and 
seizure), or the Fifth Amendment (freedom from fo
rights clearly lie within the center.  But not all the categories for rights are so 
precisely defined or presented.  For privacy, a right he was confident existed, 
Douglas had to look in the metaphorical periphery.101 
Professor Winter classified Professor H. L.A. Hart’s use of the term “penum-
bra” as an early example of radiating categories from prototypes.102 
Perhaps the most cri cized example of the penumbra metaphor103 is Jus-
 
 95. Id. at 340–41. 
 96. Professor Winter uncovers the consequences of the use of image schemas for constitutional analy-
sis in his examination of the image schema of standing.  Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the 
ro
RS 123, 125, 125 n.6 (2010) (quoting PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
EP
: A Debate 
n” Metaphor, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 627, 628 (1999)). 
ing.”  H. L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
ng Revisited: Metaphor in Legal Argumentation, 7 J. 
bra”: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 
P blem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
 97. Julie A. Oseid, The Power Of Metaphor: Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall Of Separation Between Church 
& State,” 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTO
S ARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1 (2002)). 
 98. Id. at 125 n.7 (quoting Daniel L. Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the Wall Separates
on Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of Separatio
 99. Oseid, supra note 97, at 125. 
 100. Professor Hart refers to “problems of the penumbra” as “problems which arise outside the hard core 
of standard instances or settled mean
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). 
 101. J. Christopher Rideout, Penumbral Thinki
ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 155, 177 (2010). 
 102. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 6, at 19799. 
 103. See, e.g., Burr Henly, “Penum
83 (1987); Rideout, supra note 101. 
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t the metaphor itself, but Jus-
tice Douglas’ “expression of the metaphor.”106 
4.  Complex Frames 
prote
ren, the magistrate expressed his frustration that neither 
pare
 
Griswold v. Connecticut.104  By the time of the decision, the penumbra meta-
phor was both generally accepted and had been used by both judges and legal 
scholars.  Justice Douglas’ use of the metaphor may be subject to criticism, 
but not because it is a metaphor and not subject to rigorous analysis.  Instead, 
metaphor is “highly constrained—both by its internal systematicity and co-
herence and by the social contexts in which the meaning of its systems of cor-
respondences is grounded.”105  What fails is no
a.  The Family 
Although increasingly rare in nature, embedded images of good mothers 
and nuclear families lie quietly beneath the surface of judicial decisions.  For 
example, the concept of the marital family as the ideal family was critical in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,107 when a biological father sought visitation rights 
with his child.108  Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, stated that “Califor-
nia law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.”109  Justice 
Scalia’s image of the ideal family allowed him to depict the plaintiff—the 
biological father—as an outsider without rights because historical tradition 
cts the traditional marital family unit as opposed to the biological one.110 
An enduring image of the ideal mother as primarily a nurturing figure 
who is willing to sacrifice other priorities for her children is widespread in 
child custody litigation.  Here is just one example, from a 2006 child custody 
decision from Idaho, where the magistrate extended the image of the ideal 
parent to both husband and wife.111  Asked to decide who should gain custody 
of the couple’s child
nt fit the image: 
I would encourage both of you to seek changes to your either [sic] employment 
schedule or the status of your employment.  The evidence I’ve heard so far, I’m 
gonna be up front with you about, indicates to me that these children don’t have 
two primary parental figures in their lives.  You’re only available a couple of 
 104. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 105. Rideout, supra note 101, at 189. 
 106. Id. at 190. 
 107. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 108. Id. at 114. 
 109. Id. at 118. 
 110. Id. at 124.  Justice Scalia concludes: 
Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the relationship between persons in the 
situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic 
practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded special protection.  We 
think it impossible to find that it has. In fact, quite to the contrary, our traditions have protected the 
marital family (Gerald, Carole, and the child they acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort of 
claim Michael asserts. 
Id. 
 111. Silva v. Silva, 136 P.3d 371, 374 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). 
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 n breakfast.  You don’t want to do that, then this is gonna be a 
real toss-up, I can tell you right now.  It’s gonna be very difficult for me 
to decide.112 
from commercial transactions now appear to have 
achi e Jus-
tice 
lic con-
iation since the Civil War.”   Money is not a root of evil, 
 
nights a week . . . .  Your kids have been raised by a step-dad, daycare provid-
ers, friends and grandparents.  That’s who has raised your children so far. 
  Now you’re in front of me asking to be awarded primary custody.  And you 
know what?  It’s gonna be probably the first among you who steps up, who 
wants to be there, available to them when they get out of school, when they’re 
in bed, when they need help with their homework, when they need dinner and 
when they eed 
b.  The Marketplace 
The images upon which First Amendment protection depends once fo-
cused on the individual speaker: the printing press, the orator on the street 
corner, the pamphleteer at your door.113  More complex First Amendment 
metaphors derived 
ev d the status of received truth.114  Thus, in Citizens United, Chief 
Roberts wrote: 
  The Government urges us in this case to uphold a direct prohibition on po-
litical speech.  It asks us to embrace a theory of the First Amendment that would 
allow censorship not only of television and radio broadcasts, but of pamphlets, 
posters, the Internet, and virtually any other medium that corporations and un-
ions might find useful in expressing their views on matters of pub
cern . . . .  First Amendment rights could be confined to individuals, subverting 
the vibrant public discourse that is at the foundation of our democracy. 
  The Court properly r jee cts that theory, and I join its opinion in full.  The 
First Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox and 
the lonely pamphleteer.115 
This position had been stated earlier, in the dissenting opinions in 
McConnell.  There, Justices Scalia and Thomas viewed corporate money with 
a different lens than the majority’s view of money in this context as the root 
of evil.116  The dissenting justices wrote that the majority’s decision upholding 
Titles I and II of BCRA constitutes “a sad day for the freedom of speech”;117 
the legislation itself is “the most significant abridgement of the freedoms of 
speech and assoc 118
 112. Id. 
 113. See Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes 
for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1186–95 (1989) (tracing evolution from a First Amendment image of an 
individual on a soapbox and a basement press cranking out leaflets to the marketplace of ideas, which draws 
on the metaphors of minds as machines and ideas as products and commodities); see also Linda L. Berger, 
What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers 
Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004) (applying metaphor theory to analyze the 
briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in a case raising First Amendment corporate speech issues). 
 114. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 156–57 (1980). 
 115. 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 116. 540 U.S. 93, 247 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 264 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 117. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 118. Id. at 264 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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ot limit its application in this fashion . . . 
[n]or
 the marketplace model, Justice Scalia insists that the use of 
corp ec-
tion
uch greater problem to overcome than 
merely the influence of amassed wealth.  Given the premises of democracy, 
there is no such thing as too much speech.126 
 
essary means to give voice to corporations.  Failing to recognize t
ity has 
smile[d] with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First 
Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government . . . .  
[T]his legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those 
entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice: national political 
parties and corporations . . . .119 
Not only do these entities have the resources to make their criticism 
heard, they have much to express: “giving the government power to exclude 
corporations from the political debate enables it effectively to muffle the 
voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy and 
the most passionately held social and political views.”120  Thus, “[a] candidate 
ld not be insulated from the most effective speech that the major partici-
pants in the economy and major incorporated interest groups can generate.”121 
Rather than a compelling state interest, the legislation itself had no goal 
other than to regulate speech.  Justice Scalia criticized the Court’s “cavalier 
attitude toward regulating the financing of speech” and he explained that 
“[d]ivision of labor requires a means of mediating exchange, and in a com-
mercial society, that means is supplied by money.”122  Even if the target is 
money, “where the government singles out money used to fund speech . . . it 
is acting against speech as such . . . .”123  All corporations are doing is associ-
ating with others to disseminate ideas; like those who engage in “singing or 
speaking in unison,” they are merely “pooling financial resources for expres-
sive purposes.”124  Recognizing that one proposition might justify the deci-
sion—“that the particular form of association known as a corporation does not 
enjoy full First Amendment protection”—Justice Scalia responds that “the 
text of the First Amendment does n
 is there any basis in reason why First Amendment rights should not at-
tach to corporate associations.”125 
Turning to
orate money “to speak to the electorate is unlikely to ‘distort’ el
s” because 
[t]he premise of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither 
sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of 
the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source.  If that 
premise is wrong, our democracy has a m
 119. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 120. Id. at 25758. 
 121. Id. at 258. 
 122. Id. at 25152. 
 123. Id. at 252. 
 124. Id. at 255. 
 125. Id. at 256. 
 126. Id. at 258–59 (emphasis omitted). 
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B.  Narrative (Beginnings and Endings) 
Storytelling extends beyond jury trials and fact statements in which the 
parties and claims may be portrayed as characters in a plot.  In appellate opin-
ions, the characters, events, and setting of the decision-making process are the 
stuff of stories.  Here, stories about law and judging often take center stage. 
1.  Law Stories 
a.  A Story of Origins: The U.S. Constitution 
Given the development of American law, the story of the U.S. Constitu-
tion is the foundational story of origins.  Uncovering Frederick Douglass’ 
ability to frame the U.S. Constitution to serve as a stand-in for equality (de-
spite its explicit support for unequal citizenship), Professor Milner Ball127 
identified the metaphor at work: 
“The Constitution, as well as the Declaration of Independence, and the senti-
ments of the founders of the Republic, give us a platform broad enough, and 
strong enough, to support the most comprehensive plans for the freedom and el-
evation of all the people of this country.”  On that platform, the Constitution, 
which never employs the word “slavery,” could be interpreted as antislavery, 
and the continuation of slavery could be interpreted as a discrepancy between 
the Constitution as written and the Constitution as administered.128 
Ball credits President Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address for helping to solid-
ify the Douglass version into the American canon: 
Lincoln’s opening, “Fourscore and seven years ago”—a type of “once upon a 
time”—was a reference not to 1789 and the adoption of the Constitution, but to 
1776 and the Declaration of Independence.  In that beginning the nation had 
been dedicated to the “proposition” about equality. 
. . . . 
Where Douglass drew out the story of origins by contrasting it with the story of 
slavery, Lincoln interpreted the story of origins through compatible narrative 
extension.  He interpreted the story of bringing forth the nation by embroidering 
it with the story of the war for that nation’s life.  The methods of both men were 
means for engaging narrative in the transformation of the legal order, telling 
stories so that law might include and respect the black people who had been 
excluded.129 
As Professor Ball noted, because this story of equality is now canonical, 
coherence has been achieved: “The fourteenth amendment appears to have 
belonged in the Constitution all along, the Constitution appears to have grown 
 127. Ball, supra note 30, at 2280. 
 128. Id. at 2284 (quoting Frederick Douglass, The Dred Scott Decision: An Address Delivered, in part, 
in New York, New York, in May 1857, in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 17172 (J. Blassingame ed., 
1985)). 
 129. Id. at 2285. 
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out of the Declaration of Independence, and the Declaration appears to have 
emerged from a constitutive devotion to equality.”130 
b. Stories of Beginnings: Brown and Marbury 
Continuing this canonical story of equality, Brown has during the last fif-
ty years become the shorthand symbol for the ideograph of equality: 
Brown fits nicely into a widely held and often repeated story about America and 
its Constitution.  This story has such deep resonance in American culture that 
we may justly regard it as the country’s national narrative.  I call this story the 
Great Progressive Narrative.  The Great Progressive Narrative sees America as 
continually striving for democratic ideals from its founding and eventually real-
izing democracy through its historical development . . . .  The basic ideals of 
Americans and their Constitution are promises for the future, promises that the 
country eventually will live up to, and, in so doing, confirm the country’s deep 
commitments to liberty and equality.131 
In the words of an amicus brief in a recent school district desegregation 
case, for example: 
We begin with Brown.132 
The brief continues to portray Brown as the source, or the beginning: 
That decision neither established nor supports the proposition that race may 
never be considered in the assignment of students to public schools.  Rather, the 
Court there held that the use of race for segregative purposes is impermissible.  
Nothing in Brown indicates that race-conscious integrative student assignments 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Indeed, its language and spirit . . . suggest 
the opposite: that adoption of integrative policies would be encouraged, since 
the harms of racial segregation occur regardless of whether that segregation is 
de jure or de facto. 
  No reference to strict scrutiny can be found in Brown, nor in any of the 
Court’s later school desegregation or voluntary integration decisions.133 
The path from Brown went in one direction; other directions were fol-
lowed in other cases: 
  These distinct jurisprudential paths have not converged.  Although the 
Court’s school desegregation rulings discussed the appropriate remedies for a 
constitutional violation, it is telling that the Court never articulated a need to 
balance those remedies against any students’ claims to a supposed “right” to at-
tend “neighborhood” schools, or to be free from assignments to integrated 
schools where they would have to associate with pupils of a different racial or 
ethnic group.  To the contrary, the Court has recognized that school authorities 
may (and should) pursue steps to achieve racial integration because it benefits 
all students, regardless of race.134 
 130. Id. 
 131. Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education: A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK 
CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 5 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
 132. Brief of the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at *5, Parents Involved in Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at *67 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
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The path from Brown leads inevitably to this result: 
  At bottom, respondents have done precisely what this Court has long indi-
cated that it hoped all public school systems . . . would do: they have made a 
conscious effort to build upon their prior achievements, to learn from their mis-
takes, and to continue striving toward Brown’s vision of equal, integrated pub-
lic schools.135 
Like Brown, Marbury v. Madison136 stands in for a heavily weighted 
concept. It is the source for and “the fountainhead of judicial review.”137  The 
U.S. Supreme Court routinely cites Marbury, with no explanation necessary, 
to justify its overturning of legislative actions.  Its status is such that “[i]f we 
did not already know that Marbury was so momentous a case, we would be 
hard pressed to explain why it is so celebrated.”138  But it is not the holding 
alone that makes Marbury significant both as story and symbol.  Instead 
“[w]ithin the fields of constitutional law and federal courts law, Marbury is 
not merely a case of historical importance, but a living paradigm of the neces-
sary and proper function of courts in exercising judicial review.”139 
Marbury embodies the role of the lawyer and the judge in constitu-
tional adjudication: 
  To be a constitutional lawyer is to participate in a practice that is substan-
tially founded on Marbury.  There is no stronger constitutional argument against 
a position than that it contravenes Marbury’s central holding; Marbury is too 
foundational, too ensconced, and too pervasive in influence to be rejected as 
mistaken.  Correspondingly, perhaps the strongest argument of principle in fa-
vor of a disputed constitutional position is that Marbury entails it.  Again, the 
rejection of Marbury is unthinkable.140 
c.  A Story of Birth: Miranda 
Law stories of beginnings include the recognition of new legal rights.  
Analyzing the briefs filed in Miranda v. Arizona,141 Linda Edwards concludes 
that the petitioner’s brief tells a story about the birth of the right to counsel.142  
She points out that the brief’s legal argument does not begin by explaining the 
 135. Id. at *15. 
 136. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 137. Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the Constitutional Imagination, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 1463, 146364 (2009) (analyzing Marbury as in the canon of constitutional law and Lochner as 
in the “anticanon,” representing “the fear that independent courts armed with the power of judicial review 
might run amok”). 
 138. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 
1039 (1997).  “However intriguing its politics (including Marshall’s failure to recuse himself), the fact re-
mains that the decision had little palpable import.”  Id.  That is, even “if it did contribute something to the 
acceptance of judicial review, its impact was limited to the least controversial category of cases: matters re-
lating to the proper duties of the judiciary itself  . . . .”  Id. 
 139. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of 
Doctrinal Tension, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003). 
 140. Id.  Fallon goes on to quote Paul Kahn:  “The study of constitutional law not only begins with this 
case, it ends there as well . . . .”  Id. at 12 (quoting PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICA 4 (1997)). 
 141. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 142. Linda H. Edwards, Once upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 
883, 891–92 (2010). 
BERGER_MACRO_FINAL 3/29/2011  1:03:25 PM 
2011] A Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative 297 
 
current state of the law,143 but instead with this sentence: “We deal here with 
growing law, and look to where we are going by considering where we have 
been.”144  After tracing the birth and development of the concept of the right 
to counsel, the brief concluded: 
  The right does exist.  It is the same.  This is not the result of a single case, 
Escobedo or any other.  Rather, there is a tide in the affairs of men, and it is this 
engulfing tide which is washing away the secret interrogation of the 
unprotected accused.145 
That the story involves not only the development of the law but the char-
acters of the judges involved at different stages is clear in Edwards’ descrip-
tion of one section of the brief: 
[W]e hear the voices of these four Justices urging their positions, each speaker 
breaking in when the prior speaker stops to take a breath.  There is narrative en-
ergy here.  It is a noisy scene with animated voices making their points.146 
2.  Stories of Judging 
a.  The Wise Judge: King Solomon 
The tale of King Solomon’s wisdom is one of the story metaphors we 
live by: the ideal judge of our imagination is like the image derived from the 
Biblical story.147  Like Solomon, the ideal judge embodies wisdom and judg-
ment; the judge is wisdom because he determines the right answer through the 
exercise of reason; he exemplifies judgment because he accurately assesses 
evidence that would stymie others.148 
The continuing influence of Solomon’s image as a frame and filter for 
our perceptions of judges and judging is shown in the language of judicial 
opinions as well as the claims made in public debates about how judging 
should work.  Consider this statement from the confirmation hearings on the 
nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
[O]ur legal system is based on a firm belief in an ordered universe and ob-
jective truth.  The trial is the process by which the impartial and wise 
judge guides us to the truth.149 
 143. Id. at 892–93. 
 144. Brief of Petitioner at *11, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 65-759). 
 145. Id. at *34. 
 146. Edwards, supra note 142, at 895.  For a narrative analysis of the brief filed by Abe Fortas on behalf 
of Gideon in Gideon v. Wainwright, see Jennifer Sheppard, Once upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and In a 
Galaxy Far Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in Ap-
pellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255 (2009). 
 147. See Ann Althouse, Beyond King Solomon’s Harlots: Women in Evidence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1265, 
1268–69 (1992) (noting that the “story appears in various forms in at least twenty-two folk tales from many 
cultures,” including Bertolt Brecht’s The Caucasian Chalk Circle). 
 148. For an extended discussion of this concept, see Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Struc-
tures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in 
Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259 (2009). 
 149. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  A more      
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Though it fits neatly into this formalist view of how the law works, the 
image of the wise judge also works within the opposite perspective on how 
judges make decisions.  Thus, when Judge Posner writes in How Judges 
Think, “[t]he radical uncertainty that besets judges in many of the most inter-
esting and important cases makes conventional decision theory largely inap-
plicable to judicial decision making and necessitates eclectic theorizing,”150 
who better to exemplify eclectic theorizing in a case of radical uncertainty 
than Solomon? 
Starting out as a story, the image of Solomon now stands for an entire 
decision-making framework or narrative plot complete with characters and 
conflict.  Thus, when a trial judge is acting within the recognized range of his 
discretion, he may view his judgment of the parties’ characters as akin to Sol-
omon’s.  So, for example, the trial judge in one child custody case awarded 
sole physical custody to the mother based on his observations of the wit-
nesses: “[The father] was evasive and vague . . . .  He evaded cross examina-
tion with an intense passivity that was almost pugnacious . . . .  He had a hov-
ering presence.  He was not intimidating as much as he was unsettling.”151  
On the other hand, the mother “testified in a temperate manner, soft of speech, 
spontaneous and without a pattern of aggression.  When offered opportunities 
to make partisan points, she demurred . . . .”152  As a result, the trial judge felt 
confident that the father’s courtroom demeanor predicted his conduct as a 
parent, that “he is the more rigid, the less yielding, the less sensitive, the more 
aggressive and the less likely to be willing to adjust . . . .”153 
Appellate courts also may view the trial judge’s decisions through the 
lens of Solomon’s wisdom.  Reviewing a trial court decision, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Parris v. Parris154 explained why the judge’s decision 
should be considered neutral, reasonable, and wise despite his use of language 
that seemed to show bias and prejudice: 
In making custody decisions the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each 
case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be 
weighed.  The trial judge, who observes the witnesses and is in a better position 
to judge their demeanor and veracity, is given broad discretion . . . .155 
The family court judge was presumed to have judged wisely based on the 
facts before him, though he may have spoken rashly. 
restrained, but similar, description can be found at Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Inferring the Winning Party in the Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument (U. of 
Chicago, Olin Law & Economics Program, Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 466, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1414317. 
 150. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 35 (2008). 
 151. Joseph v. Joseph, No. FA-90-0094663, 1992 WL 91684, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 1992). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 460 S.E.2d 571 (S.C. 1995). 
 155. Id. at 572 (citation omitted). 
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Similar deference to the trial judge’s assessment of the testimony given 
by the parents is found in many other cases.  In Randall v. Steward,156 the ap-
pellate court explicitly relied on the King Solomon story to provide support 
for its holding that it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the 
“father has the greater capacity and disposition . . . to give the children love 
and affection and guidance, which includes fostering a proper respect for the 
opposite parent.”157  Like the judge in Randall, the judge in another child cus-
tody decision said that “[y]ou can’t cut the child in half, so I have to make a 
decision one way or the other and I made that decision.  And, I based my de-
cision on . . . the testimony that came through at the trial,” thus justifying his 
rejection of the recommendation of the custody evaluator.158 
b.  The Judge as Reluctant Hero: Bush v. Gore 
Robert Tsai identified the trope of the reluctant lawgiver in an article 
discussing Marbury and Brown.159  As he noted there, the U.S. Supreme 
Court labored to convey the image of the judge as reluctant lawgiver in its per 
curiam decision in Bush v. Gore,160 which overturned the Florida Supreme 
Court’s order to recount the votes and resulted in George W. Bush becoming 
President.161  In that decision, the unnamed Justices wrote the following: 
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the 
Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s 
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legisla-
tures, and to the political sphere.  When contending parties invoke the process 
of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the 
federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced 
to confront.162 
Tsai characterized this rhetorical move as myth making, casting the job 
of judicial interpretation as a “divine calling” that is the judiciary’s destiny.163  
Relying on the judicial role embodied by Marbury, Justice Robert Jackson 
portrayed the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette164 
as the reluctant lawgiver when it overturned a state regulation and also 
overruled its own decision made only a few years earlier.165  In his widely 
admired opinion striking down a regulation of the West Virginia State Board 
of Education requiring the flag salute and pledge of allegiance, Jackson wrote, 
 156. 426 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 157. Id. at 469.  The court said that the trial court’s analysis was supported by statute and “corroborated 
by scientific studies on the welfare of children and understandings of ancient origin,” that is, the story of 
King Solomon.  Id. at 470 n.3. 
 158. Petersen v. Petersen, No. A06-1801, 2007 WL 1248192, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 1, 2007). 
 159. See Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095, 1124–29 (2005), for a discus-
sion of what he calls the “constitutional iconography” of these cases. 
 160. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 161. Id. at 111. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Tsai, supra note 159, at 1126. 
 164. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 165. Id. at 640. 
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“We cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such 
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history 
authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.”166 
c.  The Appellate Judge as Hero: Miranda 
The prototypical judge as hero can save the victim and advance the 
law.167  After analyzing the briefs filed on both sides, Professor Richard 
Sherwin concluded that the brief filed for the petitioner in Miranda is “a strik-
ingly dramatic narrative” in which the deciding judge is asked to take on “the 
active (one might say heroic) role of advancing a progressive movement with-
in the law in the direction of basic beliefs.”168  Constructed around universal 
themes of fate, chance, and secrecy, Sherwin concluded that the brief prepares 
the reader to reach (for himself or herself) the proper outcome to the case: 
  When Miranda walked out of Interrogation Room 2 on March 13, 1963, his 
life for all practical purposes was over.  Whatever happened later was inevita-
ble; the die had been cast in that room at that time.  There was no duress, no 
brutality.  Yet when Miranda finished his conversation with Officers Cooley 
and Young, only the ceremonies of the law remained; in any realistic sense, his 
case was done.  We have here the clearest possible example of Justice Douglas’ 
observation, “what takes place in the secret confines of the police station may 
be more critical than what takes place at the trial.”169 
As Sherwin tells it, the themes are reflected in these ways in this opening 
paragraph.  Miranda’s fate was cast because nothing else could change the 
outcome after the confession: Miranda’s fate was the result of chance, being 
in that room at that time; and his fate, determined by chance, was determined 
in secret.170  The reader understands that “the accused in police custody is 
helpless, friendless, at the mercy of forces beyond his control.  He faces the 
force of fate (once his confession is obtained) and the force of chance (in light 
of the endowments he happens to bring with him into the interrogation 
 166. Id. 
 167. Among the law stories in which the judges are cast as heroes, one scholar has identified “the 
Rehnquist Court’s frequent and dramatic invocation of the image of institutional conflict.”  Robert L. Tsai, 
Speech and Strife, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84 (2004).  As depicted in the First Amendment deci-
sions of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, Tsai found that 
the Court activating an interpretive frame of institutional discord to promote its stature.  In both in-
stances, the Court employed a conversational script about judicial power and engaged in vivid 
role-playing, casting itself and other parties in familiar parts.  In Dale, it was the state supreme 
court that imperiled liberty if the Boy Scouts could not have their way in expelling a gay Scout 
leader; in Velazquez, Congress posed the fearsome psychological threat to equal justice by prevent-
ing lawyers for the poor from challenging “existing law.” 
Id. (discussing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640 (2000)). 
 168. Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 711 (1994), 
reprinted in 6 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 88, 114 (2009). 
 169. Miranda Brief of Petitioner, supra note 144, at *10. 
 170. Sherwin, supra note 168, at 713. 
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room).”171  The police have created and are exploiting these conditions be-
cause they have power and control in secrecy.172 
To offset “such intolerable inequality and unfairness,”173 the brief writer 
counts on the U.S. Supreme Court to reach the correct conclusion: 
  We have in this galaxy of cases not a series of isolated phenomena, but re-
flections of basic belief . . . . 
  This case is not to be decided by the color-matching technique of determin-
ing whether one case looks just like another case.  We deal with fundamentals 
of liberty, and so, in consequence, with basic belief.174 
Miranda’s narrative does not depend on the specific facts or specific recom-
mendations of results: “[T]he Justices of the Court know what needs to be 
done; they have the authority to do it; let it then be done . . . .  [The story] 
casts the decisionmaker in the active role of savior on behalf of the disadvan-
taged and the helpless.”175 
IV.  A GUIDED EXPLORATION 
Once the “biasing effects of schema[]” have been raised, persuasion be-
comes more difficult.176  As soon as an unconscious and automatic knowledge 
structure has been activated, judgments are more likely to be based 
on assumptions derived from categories and schemas than on evidence of in-
dividual characteristics.177 
A.  Metaphor and Narrative as Problem Setting 
Despite this, metaphor and narrative assure us that we can re-envision 
the settings for problems.  Because problems do not present themselves with a 
particular face and frame, metaphor and narrative can be used imaginatively, 
both to change perceptions and to persuade.178  Once we recognize that prob-
lems are constructed by people who are trying to make sense out of trouble or 
complexity, we are better able to uncover the kinds of constructions that exert 
unintended control over the range of our imagined responses.179  By describ-
ing a breakdown in family structure, rather than change, evolution, or growth, 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Miranda Brief of Petitioner, supra note 144, at *34–35. 
 175. Sherwin, supra note 168, at 714. 
 176. Chen & Hanson, supra note 22, at 1223. 
 177. Id. at 122831. 
 178. George Lakoff garnered attention and criticism for his proposals to reframe major political ques-
tions around metaphors that would lead to different means of reasoning and concluding.  See generally 
GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002); GEORGE 
LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004). 
 179. See KENNETH BURKE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM 1 (1973) (“Critical and imaginative 
works are answers to questions posed by the situation in which they arose . . . .  [The strategies that we adopt 
to encompass the situations] size up the situations, name their structure and outstanding ingredients, and 
name them in a way that contains an attitude toward them.”). 
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we turn demographic trends into social problems.180  In the child custody con-
text, when we talk about families that have split up or about single or working 
or welfare mothers, the words we choose lead to seemingly natural solutions: 
we need to repair the family, marry off the mother, get some mothers back to 
nurturing, and paradoxically, get other mothers back to work. 
Problem construction is shaped not only by metaphoric frames but also 
by the stories we use to describe “what is wrong and what needs fixing.”181  
Because these stories shape our recognition of the problem, they control the 
directions we tend to follow in solving it.  So, for instance, when a father is 
described as a deadbeat dad, the Trouble (the disruption in the normal state of 
things) driving the plot can be overcome by requiring him to pay his debt and 
meet his financial obligations (rather than by requiring him to take responsi-
bility for parenting his children).  When a mother is characterized as aggres-
sive and career oriented, the conflict is resolved by declaring her role to be 
that of primary wage earner, rather than the caregiver who should 
win custody. 
Although metaphors and stories shape problem construction, they 
support problem reconstruction and problem solving as well.  Donald Schön 
gave an example of the use of metaphor to resolve problems when he 
described the way that manufacturers of synthetic-bristle paintbrushes might 
have imaginatively determined how to make their paintbrushes work more 
like natural-bristle ones.182  Once they realized that the paintbrush could be 
seen as a pump, they could redesign the synthetic bristles to work in the 
same way.183 
A new metaphor can make the target experience understandable in a dif-
ferent light by highlighting some aspects and suppressing others.  The new 
metaphor may entail very specific aspects of the source concept and give the 
target a new meaning, sanctioning different actions, justifying revised infer-
ences, and leading to different goals and results.184  Cognitive theory suggests 
some ways to re-view a current metaphor.  So, for example, the marketplace 
of ideas metaphor need not resemble the economic market but could instead 
 180. Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 16 
(2004). 
 181. Schön, supra note 15, at 138. 
 182. Id. at 13943. 
 183. Id.  To use metaphor to resolve problems, Professor Schön, suggested the problem solver must at-
tend to new features and relationships of the situation, and then rename the pieces, regroup the parts, reorder 
the frameworks, and try to see one situation as other situations.  Id. at 15061. 
  Schön’s advice is akin to the metaphor-generating advice of Kenneth Burke:  “If we are in doubt as 
to what an object is . . . we deliberately try to consider it in as many different terms as its nature permits: lift-
ing, smelling, tasting, tapping, holding in different lights, subjecting to different pressures, dividing, match-
ing, contrasting . . . .” KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 503–04 (1962) (discussing metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony in connection “with their role in the discovery and description of ‘the 
truth’ ”).  Similarly, John Dewey wrote: “The elaborate systems of science are born not of reason but of im-
pulses at first sight and flickering; impulses to handle, to move about, to hunt, to uncover, to mix things sepa-
rated and divide things combined, to talk and to listen.”  JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 
196 (1922). 
 184. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 338. 
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be depicted as the Greek agora, which served both as a market and as a central 
meeting place.185  As a public assembly for the exchange of views, the mar-
ketplace must include diverse and plural voices rather than a few overpower-
ing ones.186  Such a conception of the market might focus on protecting the 
process of the exchange, thus sanctioning government regulation to assure ef-
fective access to the market, to guard against monopolization, and to avoid the 
unequal results that flow from formal equality. 
Because embedded narratives represent past stories and events, they 
cannot be proven wrong.  Instead, advocates must discover or imagine alter-
native accounts.  By invoking individual situations and contexts, imaginative 
advocacy can overcome constraining stereotypes and enable lawyers and 
judges to examine actual experience.187  Moreover, narrative can transform 
audiences by allowing them to experience other worlds.188  For example, ra-
ther than the typical theme in a child custody case that divorce is a tragedy for 
lovers or a battleground for combatants, an advocate could depict the theme as 
a challenge to overcome common obstacles by parties working together or as 
a passage to a different stage in the life of a family. 
Similarly, Kenneth Burke’s pentadic analysis might guide advocates to 
more flexible narratives.189  In the usual child custody narrative, the Scene or 
the setting is the breakup of a marriage; that setting often controls the other 
elements of the story.  If the Scene is the breakup of a marriage, the primary 
Agents or actors most likely will be viewed as Husband and Wife, their Acts 
will be those associated with a breakup, and their Purpose will be to bring 
about an ending, not a beginning.  Instead, the story could be reconfigured so 
that the dominant element in the pentad is the Purpose of preserving relation-
ships between the children and the many important people in their lives.  With 
that Purpose dominant, the Agents would include the parents (rather than the 
Husband and Wife), the children, and all the other individuals who have im-
portant relationships with the children.  These Agents would be engaged in 
Acts designed to preserve relationships rather than interrupt them. 
B.  The Boykin v. Alabama Briefs: Storytelling and Framing 
In 1966, in Mobile County, Alabama, Edward Boykin, a twenty-seven-
year-old African-American man, pleaded guilty to five counts of robbery and 
was sentenced to death.190  The attorney who represented him was appointed 
 185. David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 
857, 894 (1986). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Brown et al., supra note 29, at 539. 
 188. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 6, at 123. 
 189. Kenneth Burke’s pentad, a tool or method of analysis, identified the elements in the drama (act, 
agent, agency, scene, and purpose) and analyzed the relationships among them.  BURKE, supra note 183, 
at xxii–xxiv. 
 190. Brief for Petitioner at *3, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (No. 68-642). 
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three days before Boykin entered the five guilty pleas that led to five death 
sentences.191  The record of the guilty plea hearing was brief: 
This day in open court came the State of Alabama by its District Attorney and 
the defendant in his own proper person and with his attorney, Evan Austill, and 
the defendant in open court on this day being arraigned on the indictment in 
these cases charging him with the offense of robbery and plead guilty.192 
In 1969, in Boykin v. Alabama, Justice Douglas declared for a majority 
of the U.S. Supreme Court that due process required reversal of Boykin’s 
death sentences.  Because the record was silent, it was insufficient to serve as 
evidence that Boykin voluntarily and knowingly waived his constitutional 
rights when he pleaded guilty.193 
1.  The Facts 
In the brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, Boykin’s attorney re-
counted Boykin’s experience with the criminal justice system in Alabama: 
Edward Boykin, Jr., a twenty-seven (27) year old Negro, son of a tenant farmer 
from Wilcox County, Alabama, was convicted on his pleas of guilty to five (5) 
separate indictments of robbery.  One jury heard all five (5) cases simultane-
ously and sentenced him to death by electrocution for each offense.194 
Boykin had been “indicted by a grand jury on June 29, 1966 on five 
counts of robbery, and bail was set at $2,500.00.”195  He was found to be in-
digent, and an attorney was appointed on July 11, 1966.196  Three days later, 
he was arraigned and entered guilty pleas to the robbery indictments.197  At 
the subsequent jury trial, the significance of which was that the jury decided 
Boykin’s sentence, the prosecutor presented testimony on each offense: 
  1.  James V. Loper, manager of a grocery-chain store, testified that on May 
8, 1966, at about 11:00 P.M., the accused and another Negro came in the store, 
pulled a gun and made the witness and another employee lie down on the floor 
while money was removed from the cash register (A 11).  The witness further 
testified that: 
  “A.  Well, after he (the accused) got the money, he turned and goes out the 
door and shoots back to see that we don’t get up and follow him, I guess.”  
(A 12) 
  The witness went on to testify that the bullet entered the door and went up 
into the ceiling.  (A 13) 
  The Defense did not question the witness.198 
 191. Id. *3–4. 
 192. Id. at *27 (quoting from A 4 of the record). 
 193. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 245 (1969). 
 194. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 190, at *3. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at *34. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at *4. 
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The petitioner’s brief then described the second robbery that was the 
subject of testimony.  Although the petitioner’s brief does not point it out, this 
apparently was the only cross examination of a witness: 
  2.  Annette Fawcett, a drug store owner, testified on May 6th at about 
9:00 P.M., two customers came into her store (one of whom she identified as 
the accused), produced a gun and took money from her cash register (A 18).  
When the accused had difficulty with the car keys, the gun went off and went 
into the floor; it ricocheted and hit the calf of a girl’s leg, who was in the store.  
The witness testified on direct examination: 
  “A.  I think maybe he intended to shoot just to frighten because the officer 
said it hit the floor and, you know.”  (A 20) 
  The cross examination focused on the discharge of the weapon wherein the 
witness again testified: 
  “A.  I don’t believe that he really intended to kill her, but . . . .”  (A 21)199 
Next came the third and fourth robberies on which testimony was presented: 
  3.  Jerry Smith, an employee of a retail ice cream business, stated that on 
April 23, 1966, at about 11:40 P.M., he was met by the accused at the rear door 
of the establishment.  The accused produced a gun and after entering the place, 
took money from the cash register.  (A 23) 
  The Defense did not question the witness. 
  4.  John E. G. Campbell, operator of a combination service station, grocery 
and general merchandising store, stated that on May 5, 1966, at about 
8:00 P.M., the accused and an accomplice entered his store.  They held him up 
and took some money from the cash register.  Frustrated in an attempt to take 
the witness’s car, the accused and his accomplice ran down the street away from 
Mr. Campbell’s place of business.  (A 27) 
  The Defense did not question the witness.200 
Finally, the fifth robbery: 
  5.  Sylvester Pugh, a service station operator, testified on May 3, 1966, he 
was about to close for the night when two individuals (one being the accused) 
produced a 45 caliber pistol and took money from the cash register where he 
was counting it. After having the witness walk away from the station (one-half 
block), the accused departed.  (A 30) 
  The Defense did not question the witness.201 
And backtracking to the third robbery: 
  6.  Walter Hersh, the owner of the ice cream parlor, testified that he was not 
present during the robbery, but because it was his property that was taken, he 
was called to his place of business.  (A 25) 
  The Defense did not question the witness.202 
In the fact statement, the petitioner’s brief focuses first on the shortcom-
ings of Boykin’s trial attorney, who “offered no evidence for the accused as to 
any of the offenses, nor was any evidence offered by defense counsel 
 199. Id. at *45. 
 200. Id. at *5. 
 201. Id. at *5–6. 
 202. Id. at *6. 
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in mitigation or extenuation of the offenses.”203  After pointing out that the 
jury returned five verdict-sentence pronouncements of guilty and death by 
electrocution,204 Boykin’s appellate attorney shifts the focus to the failure of 
the court system to provide or to allow appellate counsel for Boykin: an ap-
peal was “automatically ordered by the Court as is required in capital sen-
tences, but no attorney was appointed, by the Court order, to prosecute the 
appeal although indigency had previously been determined.”205  An American 
Civil Liberties Union staff lawyer “voluntarily undertook the appeal on behalf 
of the Petitioner, but was notified . . . by the Deputy Clerk of the Supreme 
Court of Alabama, that he was not authorized to practice before that 
Court.”206  Another lawyer agreed to undertake the appeal, briefs were sub-
mitted, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.207  “During that time 
and until now, Edward Boykin, Jr. has been on death row in Kilby Prison, 
Montgomery, Alabama awaiting execution for robbery.”208 
In contrast to this detailed account of the trial court process in the peti-
tioner’s brief, the entire focus of the fact statement of the state’s brief is on the 
record showing that the barebones requirements of the judicial process were 
satisfied.  Here is the entirety of the “Statement” in Alabama’s brief: 
  The petitioner was tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Mobile Coun-
ty, Alabama, of robbery. 
  The record discloses that defendant was represented by court-appointed 
counsel and pleaded guilty to five separate indictments charging him with 
committing five separate robberies respectively.  Jury verdict was guilty of rob-
bery, as charged in the indictment, on his plea of guilty and finding that he suf-
fer death by electrocution.  Sentence of death by electrocution was pronounced 
by the Court (R. pp. 6–8).209 
From the point of view of Alabama, all the relevant facts appear here.  
The record discloses that Boykin was properly tried and convicted—he had a 
lawyer, he pleaded guilty, there was a jury verdict based on the plea, a jury 
finding of the sentence, and a sentence by the court. 
2.  The Legal Arguments 
After telling a story about Alabama’s criminal justice system in the fact 
statement, the petitioner’s brief frames its primary legal argument with a 
theme that suggests that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it strikes 
so randomly. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *7. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Brief and Argument of Respondent at *2–3, Boykin, 395 U.S. 238 (No. 68-642). 
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  Edward Boykin, Jr., awaiting execution in a death row cell at Kilby Prison in 
Montgomery, Alabama, is a unique person—few are similarly situated and few 
could be. 
  Edward Boykin, Jr. was not sentenced to death because he committed five 
(5) robberies—many others do as much and more without being sentenced to 
die for it.  Nor was he sentenced to death because he (i) committed five (5) rob-
beries (ii) in Alabama—although there are very few other places where it would 
be possible, let alone probable, that he would be so sentenced for such a crime. 
He probably was not sentenced to death because he (i) committed five (5) rob-
beries (ii) in Alabama and (iii) is poor and black—although all these elements 
were important.  The additional indispensable elements are probably known, 
consciously or subconsciously, only by the jury which condemned him to die. 
  The point is that Edward Boykin, Jr. is unique because today the imposition 
of the death penalty is unique. 
  As this brief will show, there is a growing realization that the death penalty 
is unwarranted in principle and requires so rare a combination of people, places 
and prejudice as to border on a grotesque fluke. 
  And because the death penalty is today both unwarranted and a fluke, it is 
“cruel and unusual” and unconstitutional as applied to Edward Boykin, Jr.210 
In response, Alabama framed the death sentence as a rational decision 
justified by state statute and the circumstances.  First, the brief claimed, it is 
not cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty “when the sen-
tence is within the limits set by State statute.”211  The brief continues, “The 
people of Alabama and most of the rest of the people of the United States re-
gard robbery as a very serious crime.  Alabama regards it as a capital of-
fense.”212  Characterizing the case as one in which aggravating circumstances 
might have been found, the state’s brief contends that: “Boykin shot one little 
girl and showed a flagrant disregard for human life by firing into the stores 
when leaving.  He and the people of Mobile are fortunate that he did not kill 
anyone.”213  Finally, Alabama argues that executing Boykin “will serve as a 
deterrent to those who regard such things as robbery, arson, looting, etc. as a 
way of life and an exercise of their ‘rights.’ ”214 
Rather than the framing of the legal arguments used by either of the par-
ties, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the first of the three questions posed 
by the amicus brief of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund: 
1.  Whether the Supreme Court of Alabama erred in affirming Boykin’s capital 
conviction and sentence of death upon a guilty plea, where the record does not 
reflect that the trial court made appropriate inquiry to assure that the plea was 
voluntary and understanding as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments?215 
 210. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 190, at *8–9. 
 211. Brief and Argument of Respondent, supra note 209, at *3. 
 212. Id. at *8. 
 213. Id. at *9. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, 
Boykin, 395 U.S. 238 (No. 68-642).  The petitioner’s brief phrased the questions as statements: 
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According to the amicus brief, the relevant facts pertaining to that ques-
tion presented are those surrounding the appointment of Boykin’s counsel and 
the record of Boykin’s trial court appearances: 
July 11, 1966, Boykin was interrogated by the court and found to be unrepre-
sented and indigent.  He said he did not want counsel, but the court deemed 
counsel necessary and appointed a lawyer.  App. 2-3.  July 14, Boykin appeared 
with appointed counsel for arraignment on the five robbery charges, pled guilty 
to each, and was remanded for sentencing.  The minute entry for this date con-
sists of eleven lines reciting his appearance, the presence of his lawyer, and his 
plea.  App. 4.  Unlike the minute entry of July 11, it does not reflect that Boykin 
was addressed or questioned by the court, or that he said a word.216 
The amicus brief then described the Alabama Supreme Court’s affirmance of 
the death sentence that rejected the claim of cruel and unusual punishment but 
made no mention of the other federal claims.217 
In the face of the silent record, the brief then asks the reader to fill in the 
blanks, to imagine what circumstances might possibly have led Boykin to 
plead guilty to offenses that carried the possibility of a death sentence: 
Three days after the first appointment of counsel, this indigent defendant was 
arraigned on five separate capital charges and pleaded guilty to all of them.  
These circumstances alone are cause for the gravest concern.218 
Why does the short period of time between appointment and arraignment 
matter? The brief suggests that the outcome, the entry of the guilty pleas, 
makes no sense: 
In the absence of some deal or understanding that excludes the death penalty, it 
is simply inconceivable that—on three days total time to investigate five distinct 
robbery charges—a plea could be entered which exposes the defendant to 
electrocution.219 
What does the silence of the record suggest?  The brief invites the reader 
to imagine the circumstances: 
One cannot say, and cannot imagine, what could have been in the mind of 
Boykin or his appointed lawyer.  The record contains not one word concerning 
1.  The imposition of the death penalty for robbery constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2.  The Supreme Court of Alabama failed to protect petitioner’s right to due process with regard to 
his plea of guilty. 
3.  The sentence of death imposed on the petitioner by the Alabama jury violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 190, at *3 (modified typeface).  The state’s brief phrased the questions 
this way: 
1.  Does imposition of the death penalty upon conviction for robbery violate the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments? 
2.  Did the trial court fail to protect petitioner’s right to due process with regard to his plea of 
guilty? 
3.  Does the finding of guilty and punishment within the limits set by the statute violate due proc-
ess in the absence of a statute providing for separate juries to render verdicts and assess punish-
ment? 
Brief and Argument of Respondent, supra note 209, at *2. 
 216. Id. at *12. 
 217. Id. at *14–15. 
 218. Id. at *16. 
 219. Id. at *16–17. 
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the circumstances of the plea, except that Boykin was in court and also “There-
upon in open court on this day, Defendant’s Attorney, Evan Austill, was in 
court.”  App. 4.  No inquiry was put on the record as to whether the plea was 
entered understandingly or ignorantly, freely or under inducement.  The infer-
ence is strong that no such inquiry was made, for the minute entry reciting 
Boykin’s plea reflects no interrogation of the defendant by the court, while a 
similar minute entry on the occasion of Boykin’s earlier appearance for ap-
pointment of counsel relates in detail questions put by the court and answers by 
Boykin.  App. 2–3, 4.  On the date of his plea, there is no indication that the 
court addressed Boykin, or that he himself said anything.220 
And the brief then raises the most problematic conclusion that might be drawn 
from the silent record: 
For aught that appears, the judicial confessions by which his life became forfeit 
were made on his behalf without his personal participation.221 
In response, the Alabama brief barely acknowledged this framing of the 
issue.  Responding to the argument that the trial court should have made an 
affirmative showing on the record of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the 
state’s brief quotes a Mississippi case: “The judgment itself raises 
a presumption that what ought to have been done by the trial judge with re-
spect to receiving such plea was done.”222  Moreover, Alabama has no ex-
plicit statutory requirements pertaining to the trial court’s duty to admonish 
the defendant of the consequence of his guilty plea.223  Rather, the statutory 
duty of the trial court in Alabama is to “cause the punishment to be deter-
mined by a jury, except where the punishment is by law required to be fixed 
by the court.”224  Finally, the state relies on Justice Lawson’s concurrence in 
the Alabama Supreme Court, in which he w
Of course, a trial judge should not accept a guilty plea unless he has determined 
that such a plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered by the defendant.  But 
neither the Howard case, supra, nor the Mississippi cases, supra, hold that the 
record must affirmatively show that the trial judge made such a determination.  
The effect of the dissenting opinion is to presume that the trial judge failed to 
do his duty.225 
And finally, as had the Alabama Supreme Court, the state’s brief notes that 
the defendant theoretically could raise the same points in other proceed-
226
C.  The Boykin v. Alabama Opinions 
Next, a guided tour of the U.S. Supreme Court opinions, using the tools 
 220. Id. at *17. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Brief and Argument of Respondent, supra note 209, at *10. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at *11 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968) (Lawson, J., concurring)). 
 226. Id. at *12. 
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persuade, first by uncovering and then by reframing the issues and arguments 
and re-charting the paths of characters and plots.227 
Having adopted the Legal Defense Fund’s question presented—whether 
the record was sufficient to assure that the plea was voluntary and understand-
ing as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—the majority and 
the dissenting opinions envision the trial court proceedings.  First, the facts as 
presented by Justice Douglas in the majority opinion: 
[¶ 1]  In the spring of 1966, within the period of a fortnight, a series of armed 
robberies occurred in Mobile, Alabama.  The victims, in each case, were local 
shopkeepers open at night who were forced by a gunman to hand over money.  
While robbing one grocery store, the assailant fired his gun once, sending a bul-
let through a door into the ceiling.  A few days earlier in a drugstore, the robber 
had allowed his gun to discharge in such a way that the bullet, on ricochet from 
the floor, struck a customer in the leg.  Shortly thereafter, a local grand jury re-
turned five indictments against petitioner, a 27-year-old Negro, for common-
law robbery—an offense punishable in Alabama by death.228 
Analyzing the narrative structure of this opening paragraph—in particu-
lar, the named characters and their actions—the reader is left with the impres-
sion that the petitioner was not actively involved in the crimes for which he 
was convicted.  He did not rob the victims, a series of armed robberies oc-
curred; he did not force the shopkeepers to hand over money, they were 
forced by a gunman to do so.229  Although “the assailant,” not identified as 
the petitioner, did fire a gun, it was only once, and the bullet went through a 
door into the ceiling.230  In another robbery, the petitioner did not shoot a cus-
tomer but allowed his gun to discharge so that the bullet ricocheted from the 
floor to strike the custo
In the second paragraph, the Court determined that the petitioner was in-
digent, and the petitioner entered a plea, but beyond that, no characters were 
active agents.  So far as the record shows, no questions were asked and no 
statements were made: 
[¶ 2]  Before the matter came to trial, the court determined that petitioner was 
indigent and appointed counsel to represent him.  Three days later, at his ar-
raignment, petitioner pleaded guilty to all five indictments.  So far as the record 
 227. The narrative analysis is based on the use of Kenneth Burke’s pentad to identify the elements in the 
drama (act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose) and analyze the relationships among them.  See BURKE, supra 
note 183, at 503–04.  For purposes of this discussion, I have identified only the characters (agents) and 
their actions (acts). 
  The narrative reconstruction relies on Amsterdam and Bruner’s plot elements described in  
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113–14.  The metaphor analysis relies on cognitive metaphor the-
ory; the re-imaging draws on Laura E. Little, Characterization & Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372 
(1996), reprinted in 6 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 121 (2009) (Little suggests reviewing the impe-
tus for the dispute through four lenses: expanding or contracting universe, rival components, common de-
nominator, and competing worldviews.). 
 228. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added).  I have added paragraph numbers in brackets, and I have 
italicized characters and actions so that I can more easily describe the analysis. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
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shows, the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and peti-
tioner did not address the court.232 
Both the characters and the record remain silent in the third paragraph: 
[¶3]  Trial strategy may of course make a plea of guilty seem the desirable 
course.  But the record is wholly silent on that point and throws no light on it.233 
In the fourth paragraph, the state of Alabama provides a rule, but the peti-
tioner and his counsel remain uninvolved and inactive. 
[¶ 4]  Alabama provides that when a defendant pleads guilty, “the court must 
cause the punishment to be determined by a jury” (except where it is required to 
be fixed by the court) and may “cause witnesses to be examined, to ascertain the 
character of the offense.”  In the present case a trial of that dimension was held, 
the prosecution presenting its case largely through eyewitness testimony.  
Although counsel for petitioner engaged in cursory cross-examination, 
petitioner neither testified himself nor presented testimony concerning his 
character and background.  There was nothing to indicate that he had a prior 
criminal record.234 
Finally, in the fifth paragraph, Justice Douglas introduces some charac-
ters who act with purpose.  The judge and jury stress the petitioner’s record, 
find him guilty, and sentence him to die: 
[¶ 5]  In instructing the jury, the judge stressed that petitioner had pleaded 
guilty in five cases of robbery, defined as “the felonious taking of money from 
another against his will by violence or by putting him in fear (carrying) from ten 
years minimum in the penitentiary to the supreme penalty of death by electrocu-
tion.”  The jury, upon deliberation, found petitioner guilty and sentenced him 
severally to die on each of the five indictments.235 
Not until the sixth paragraph do we find any characters who might be 
characterized as heroic actors.  Four justices of the Alabama Supreme Court 
discuss the constitutionality of the process and three dissent from affirming 
the death sentences: 
[¶ 6]  Taking an automatic appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, petitioner ar-
gued that a sentence of death for common-law robbery was cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, a suggestion which 
that court unanimously rejected.  On their own motion, however, four of the 
seven justices discussed the constitutionality of the process by which the trial 
judge had accepted petitioner’s guilty plea.  From the order affirming the trial 
court, three justices dissented on the ground that the record was inadequate to 
show that petitioner had intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty.  The fourth 
member concurred separately, conceding that “a trial judge should not accept a 
guilty plea unless he has determined that such a plea was voluntarily and know-
ingly entered by the defendant,” but refusing “(f)or aught appearing” “to pre-
sume that the trial judge failed to do his duty.”  We granted certiorari.236 
In the seventh paragraph, Justice Douglas focuses attention on the Ala-
bama statute that requires the reviewing court to comb the record. 
 232. Id. (emphasis added). 
 233. Id. at 240 (emphasis added). 
 234. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 235. Id. (emphasis added) 
 236. Id. at 24041 (emphasis added). 
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[¶ 7]  Respondent does not suggest that we lack jurisdiction to review the volun-
tary character of petitioner’s guilty plea because he failed to raise that federal 
question below and the state court failed to pass upon it.  But the question was 
raised on oral argument and we conclude that it is properly presented.  The very 
Alabama statute (Ala. Code, Tit. 15, § 382 (10) (1958)) that provides automatic 
appeal in capital cases also requires the reviewing court to comb the record for 
“any error prejudicial to the appellant, even though not called to our attention in 
brief of counsel.”  The automatic appeal statute “is the only provision under the 
Plain Error doctrine of which we are aware in Alabama criminal appellate re-
view.”  In the words of the Alabama Supreme Court: 
Perhaps it is well to note that in reviewing a death case under the au-
tomatic appeal statute, . . . we may consider any testimony that was 
seriously prejudicial to the rights of the appellant and may reverse 
thereon, even though no lawful objection or exception was made 
thereto.  Our review is not limited to the matters brought to our atten-
tion in brief of counsel.237 
In Justice Douglas’ account of the facts, Boykin played a very minor 
role: he was not very active in the crimes that were committed and he is much 
less noticeable in the proceedings in the trial court. So far as the record shows, 
Boykin was at most a silent presence.  The appellate court judges were thus 
correct when they determined that: 
[¶ 8]  It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept 
petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent 
and voluntary . . . .  A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that 
the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give 
judgment and determine punishment.238 
Only then does Justice Douglas explain why it is important to have the 
trial judge question the defendant on the record: 
[¶ 9]  We think that the same standard must be applied to determining whether a 
guilty plea is voluntarily made.  For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more 
than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction.  Ignorance, incomprehension, 
coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect 
cover-up of unconstitutionality.  The question of an effective waiver of a 
federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by federal 
standards.239 
The silent record leads Justice Douglas to accept the Legal Defense Fund 
brief’s invitation to fill in the blanks and to imagine what happened beyond 
what was contained in the record, to conjecture that the defendant might have 
entered the guilty pleas because of fear, ignorance, or promises.  Thus, the si-
lence of the record may be a cover-up for unconstitutional state actions.  And 
so he concludes: 
[¶ 12]  The three dissenting justices in the Alabama Supreme Court stated the 
law accurately when they concluded that there was reversible error “because the 
 237. Id. at 24142 (citations omitted). 
 238. Id. at 242. 
 239. Id. at 24243 (emphasis added). 
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record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly en-
tered his pleas of guilty.”240 
In contrast to Justice Douglas, Justice Harlan describes the trial court 
proceedings as being remarkable only because of the defendant’s failure to 
allege that his guilty plea was involuntary or made without knowledge of the 
consequences.  The facts as presented by Justice Harlan in dissent: 
[¶ 1]  The Court today holds that petitioner Boykin was denied due process of 
law, and that his robbery convictions must be reversed outright, solely because 
“the record (is) inadequate to show that petitioner intelligently and knowingly 
pleaded guilty.”  [T]he Court does all this at the behest of a petitioner who 
has never at any time alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary or made 
without knowledge of the consequences.  I cannot possibly subscribe to so bi-
zarre a result.241 
In Justice Harlan’s account, the grand jury returned an indictment, the 
petitioner pleaded guilty, and the record merely neglects to show what ques-
tions the arraigning judge asked: 
[¶ 2]  In June 1966, an Alabama grand jury returned five indictments against 
petitioner Boykin, on five separate charges of common-law robbery.  He was 
determined to be indigent, and on July 11 an attorney was appointed to 
represent him.  Petitioner was arraigned three days later.  At that time, in open 
court and in the presence of his attorney, petitioner pleaded guilty to all five 
indictments.  The record does not show what inquiries were made by the 
arraigning judge to confirm that the plea was made voluntarily and 
knowingly.242 
In his third paragraph, Justice Harlan indicates that the petitioner had the 
opportunity to withdraw his plea, but repeatedly took no action.  He made no 
attempt to withdraw the plea in the months between his plea and the trial, and 
he made no effort to withdraw the plea after hearing the judge announce the 
plea and the possible death sentence.243 
[¶ 3]  Petitioner was not sentenced immediately after the acceptance of his plea.  
Instead, pursuant to an Alabama statute, the court ordered that “witnesses be 
examined, to ascertain the character of the offense,” in the presence of a jury 
which would then fix petitioner’s sentence.  That proceeding occurred some 
two months after petitioner pleaded guilty.  During that period, petitioner made 
no attempt to withdraw his plea.  Petitioner was present in court with his attor-
ney when the witnesses were examined.  Petitioner heard the judge state the el-
ements of common-law robbery and heard him announce that petitioner had 
pleaded guilty to that offense and might be sentenced to death.  Again, peti-
tioner made no effort to withdraw his plea.244 
Again in the fourth paragraph, Justice Harlan describes a petitioner who 
repeatedly failed to make any claims or raise any questions about whether his 
plea was voluntary and knowing. 
 240. Id. at 244 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968)). 
 241. Id. at 244–45 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 242. Id. at 245 (emphasis added). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 24546 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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[¶ 4]  On his appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, petitioner did not claim 
that his guilty plea was made involuntarily or without full knowledge of the 
consequences.  In fact, petitioner raised no questions at all concerning the plea.  
In his petition and brief in this Court, and in oral argument by counsel, 
petitioner has never asserted that the plea was coerced or made in ignorance of 
the consequences.245 
Without an assertion that the plea was involuntary or unknowing: 
[¶ 5]  The Court’s reversal is therefore predicated entirely upon the failure of the 
arraigning state judge to make an “adequate” record.246 
Because he views the silent record much differently than Justice Doug-
las, Justice Harlan concludes that: 
[¶ 6]  I would hold that petitioner Boykin is not entitled to outright reversal of 
his conviction simply because of the “inadequacy” of the record pertaining to 
his guilty plea.  Further, I would not vacate the judgment below and remand for 
a state-court hearing on voluntariness.  For even if it is assumed for the sake of 
argument that petitioner would be entitled to such a hearing if he had alleged 
that the plea was involuntary, a matter which I find it unnecessary to decide, the 
fact is that he has never made any such claim.  Hence, I consider that 
petitioner’s present arguments relating to his guilty plea entitle him to no 
federal relief.247 
From the construction of their fact statements, it is clear that the two jus-
tices have filled in the blanks in the record by imagining very different worlds 
confronting criminal defendants.  Faced with an incomplete record, Justice 
Douglas imagines that a number of improper influences and pressures might 
have caused the defendant to plead guilty: “Ignorance, incomprehension, co-
ercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-
up of unconstitutionality.”248 
Justice Harlan, on the other hand, imagines a world in which had such 
improper influences or pressures been involved in the guilty plea—had there 
been promises, threats, coercion, or inducements—the petitioner would have 
complained.  The petitioner would have objected that he did not really want to 
plead guilty or that he did not really know the consequences of doing so.  
Given the petitioner’s silence, Justice Harlan assumes that the trial court judge 
followed the constitutionally sound process. 
Although the worlds they imagine are so different, both Justices adopt 
the same governing image: the metaphor of the record as a stand-in for what 
actually happened to Boykin.  Justice Douglas depicts the current record as 
impenetrable or incomplete, a means of making possible a cover-up of uncon-
stitutional actions.  Still, Justice Douglas appears to believe that a more com-
plete record, one that reflects the trial judge’s questioning of the defendant, 
would be a clear reflection of Boykin’s circumstances.  For Justice Harlan, 
 245. Id. at 246. 
 246. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). 
 247. Id. at 24849 (emphasis added). 
 248. Id. at 244.  Several years earlier, Justice Douglas had concluded that “what takes place in the secret 
confines of the police station may be more critical than what takes place at the trial.”  Crooker v. California, 
357 U.S. 433, 444–45 (1958). 
BERGER_MACRO_FINAL 3/29/2011  1:03:25 PM 
2011] A Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative 315 
 
with or without the trial judge’s questioning, the record is both transparent 
and complete, a window revealing reality. 
D.  Re-Imagining the Law’s Frames and the Judges’ Paths 
The Boykin stories are not stories of crime and punishment.  Instead, 
they are stories of appellate review in which appellate judges act as heroes or 
troublemakers when they comb the record.  Is it possible for lawyers to use 
metaphor and narrative to re-imagine the Boykin stories and images in a way 
that would allow them to persuade the judges to fill in the blanks differently 
and reach a different outcome?249 
In Justice Douglas’ story, the Trouble that sets the plot into motion is the 
trial court’s failure to provide an adequate record so that an appellate court 
can judge whether constitutional standards were met.  Using the tool provided 
by the statute requiring that they comb the record, the Trouble prompts the 
only heroic characters, three dissenting Alabama Supreme Court justices, to 
make efforts to overcome the Trouble, resulting in their opinion that the trial 
court sentence should be reversed.  In Justice Harlan’s story, the Trouble that 
sets the plot in motion is the appellate courts’ discovery and later review of a 
grounds for reversal that was never raised by the petitioner.  This Trouble 
could be overcome if the reviewing courts stay within the appropriate bounda-
ries of appellate review and refuse to countenance so “bizarre a result.” 
To re-tell these stories, lawyers would focus instead on other Troubles 
that need to be resolved by other sets of characters.  For example, the Trouble 
might be re-cast as the failure of Boykin’s defense attorney to fully investi-
gate the charges against Boykin as well as Boykin’s background and the at-
torney’s failure to negotiate a reasonable plea bargain before allowing Boykin 
to plead guilty.  The set of characters who might resolve this Trouble could 
include both the trial court judge and the Alabama Supreme Court justices, all 
of whom could be instructed to re-examine the case to determine whether the 
petitioner’s counsel was ineffective.  In this version of the story, the record 
would no longer be silent.  Instead, it would reveal that the petitioner’s attor-
ney did not sufficiently protect his client. 
Both the majority and the dissent in Boykin implicitly frame their legal 
arguments around the appropriate scope and procedures of appellate review.  
In Justice Douglas’ opinion, the dispute appears to center on how federal ap-
pellate review can best assure that the trial court process has been sufficiently 
protective of the defendant’s constitutional rights when a defendant pleads 
guilty.  In Justice Harlan’s opinion, the dispute appears to center more gener-
ally on how best to observe appropriate constraints on the role of appellate 
judges in reviewing trial court proceedings. 
 249. For suggestions on teaching and using creative techniques to solve legal problems, see Carrie Men-
kel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 12444 (2001). 
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Re-characterization of the dispute along the lines suggested by Laura 
Little allows each side’s lawyer to cast doubt on the other side’s frame of ref-
erence.250  The NAACP’s amicus brief is an example of the kind of alterna-
tive framing of the issues in which lawyers often engage, focusing first on the 
question of whether the record was adequate rather than the question of 
whether imposing the death penalty for robbery was cruel and unusual.251 
Through re-characterization, Alabama’s lawyer might argue that the is-
sue of protecting a defendant’s constitutional rights when pleading guilty is 
broader than Justice Douglas’ narrow focus on federal appellate review.  
From this perspective, a number of other government entities and actors 
should play a part in assuring protection of the defendant’s rights.  This re-
characterization could shift the responsibility for assuring that the defendant’s 
plea was knowing and voluntary away from the trial judge to other actors.  It 
might also allow the lawyer to argue for alternatives other than questioning on 
the record as better guarantees that the defendant had in fact knowingly and 
voluntarily entered the plea. 
Alabama’s lawyer might also re-characterize the dispute as involving ri-
val components within the parties’ joint concern of assuring protection of de-
fendants’ due process rights.  Then, the state’s lawyer might argue that feder-
alism, reliance, and deference to trial judges are the important common 
denominators that should lead to a result other than having the federal courts 
overturn the decisions of state trial judges in thousands of cases.  Finally, Al-
abama might argue that Justice Douglas’ world view is fundamentally wrong: 
that is, the state criminal justice system will work well only so long as federal 
courts respect the integrity and independence of trial court judges and assume, 
absent claims to the contrary, that they have fulfilled their responsibilities. 
To persuade Justice Harlan to view the dispute differently, the peti-
tioner’s attorney might re-characterize the impetus for the dispute as assuring 
recognition of as many genuine constitutional claims as possible while still 
observing appropriate limitations on the role of appellate review.  In that case, 
the petitioner’s attorney might argue, a trial court record is needed to allow 
appellate review in those rare circumstances when no other government entity 
or actor has the opportunity to identify and correct the problem.  Another way 
 250. See generally Little, supra note 227. 
 251. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
215, at *17.  The NAACP’s amici brief posed the question of cruel and unusual punishment and expressed 
the belief that that issue was the most important general question raised by the petition: 
The issues of widest importance in this case, and those in which amici are principally interested, 
are the questions whether Edward Boykin’s sentence of death for simple robbery violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, and wheth-
er its imposition in the unfettered discretion of a jury, which was empowered by Alabama law to 
choose between the penalties of death and imprisonment arbitrarily, capriciously, for any reason, 
or for no reason, violates the rule of law basic to the Due Process Clause.  We must note at the out-
set, however, that in our view the judgment of conviction and sentence below cannot be sustained 
on this record consistently with the Constitution, and that reversal is required for a reason quite in-
dependent of the two important issues presented relating to the validity of the death penalty. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  The brief nonetheless made the successful argument first and well. 
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to re-view the dispute would be to acknowledge the common denominator, 
that both state and federal judges are interested in protecting the constitutional 
rights of the defendant, and to suggest that their common interest requires a 
consistent process to be in place in all cases. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Rhetorical analysis is a concretely useful tool for anyone who studies or 
practices law or legal persuasion.  By studying the products of legal rhetoric, 
we become better interpreters of what we read.  As we learn more about how 
rhetoric works in a particular context, including how to make more effective 
use of language and alternative meaning frames, we become better composers 
of effective legal texts.  Both interpretation and composition benefit from a 
rhetorical perspective, that is, a perspective that purposefully adopts different 
lenses to support the kind of imagination that makes for more effective argu-
mentation and persuasion. 
The purpose of this field guide has been to provide a brief introduction 
to rhetorical analysis in order to illuminate the work of metaphor and narra-
tive in lawyers’ briefs and judges’ opinions.  Though the use of the word rhet-
oric may still sound like “an indictment” to some, my intention has been to 
adhere to the “ancient and honorable” meaning associated with Aristotle: to 
see how persuasion works in the field.252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 252. Donald N. McCloskey, The Lawyerly Rhetoric of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 
425, 425 (1993). 
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